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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this report is to accomplish the following objectives: 
1. Review and analysis of existing and future e-ID standards and technologies 
 
2. Review and analysis of national e-ID card schemes (in Europe), including their 
objectives and the policy drivers (motivation). 
 
3. A review of the applications that e-ID cards enable, both for public policy 
purposes and commercial usage (planned & actual). 
 
4. Lessons learned from existing e-ID card schemes (successes and failures) and 
determine whether new international schemes/standards will address past 
short-comings or not. 
 
As a result of attempting to accomplish these objectives, it became apparent that 
across Europe we are still in a fairly early stage of development. More importantly, 
there is no coordinated effort across Europe to implement e-ID cards. Leading e-ID 
card schemes to be designed and implemented at a national level has lead to a 
heterogeneous collection of scheme types. Not only is there an inconsistency in the 
primary objectives of e-ID cards, the use of different standards and technologies 
has lead to a lack of interoperability between schemes.  
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2. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to considerable press coverage [1], electronic identity (e-ID) Cards have 
recently been a topic both at a European Union [2], and at national levels [3]. In 
addition, the technologies underlying e-ID Cards, many of which will be reviewed in 
this project, are also technologies with varying levels of maturity and certainly all of 
which are still actively being studied in the research community [2]. 
 
At a very high level, there probably are three key reasons why e-ID cards have 
received prominent attention: 
 
• Political and legal pressures to implement electronic Passports, which 
include smartcard and biometric technologies, following specifications 
mandated by International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Document 
9303. 
• The passing in 1999 of the European Directive on Electronic Signatures [4] 
has lead to various initiatives both at a pan-European and national level 
to enable the realisation of this directive. 
• Multiple national initiatives to define and deploy advanced identity cards, 
including the ability to support functionality for the above two points. 
 
While the topic of e-ID cards is a topical one, an academic paper illustrating the 
challenges and basic functions of an e-ID card goes back to over twenty years ago. 
Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir highlighted at CRYPTO ’86 [5] the limitations brought 
about with not using e-ID technology: 
 
• Passports can be photocopied by hostile governments 
• Credit card numbers can be copied 
• Computer passwords are vulnerable to hackers and wire-tappers   
• Military Command & Control terminals may fall into enemy hands 
 
Fiat and Shamir illustrated [6] three levels of protection which could be applied 
using e-ID cards.  
 
Scheme Description 
Identification A can prove to B that he is A, but someone else can 
not prove to B that he is A 
Authentication A can prove to B that he is A, but B can not prove to 
someone else that he is A  
Signature A can prove to B that he is A, but B can not prove to 
himself that he is A 
Table 1: Three Levels of Protection [6]  
 
These three schemes, which are also referred to as I-A-S (Identification, 
Authentication & Signature), remain key pillars in defining the primary capabilities 
of today’s e-ID Cards.  
 
When reviewing e-ID related literature for this project, it became apparent that 
there are two schools of thought that are studying and attempting to define the 
necessary steps for wide-scale adoption of e-ID cards. The one school attempts to 
use I-A-S features and representation of an identity in electronic form (e-ID) to 
meet the national legislation that fulfils the requirements of the European  Directive 
on Electronic Signatures [4]. A second school tends to look more at extending 
existing ID card schemes to make them more secure. Adding a smartcard chip to 
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an identity card can make it harder to forge or offer additional functions to be 
added to the card, above and beyond being presented by the holder to identify 
themselves.  In some cases these two schools overlap, such as when the former 
school looks to represent their e-ID token on a national identity card. Likewise, 
existing national identity card issuers look to add new features, such as supporting 
it for electronically signing documents or providing sophisticated e-Government 
services. Both schools use the same term, e-ID card, to mean in many cases two 
different things. In addition, the initiatives to launch ePassports, has caused further 
confusion, because some of the base technology, such as smartcards, are the 
same. However, the challenges and primary functions are from the onset different. 
Passports are seen as a border control document. National e-ID cards will focus on 
“everything else”, though some countries are looking to integrate e-Passport 
functionality into their e-ID cards. 
 
Needless to say, the confusion caused by using the same terminology for different 
things, has lead the necessity to define the scope of e-ID Cards for purposes of this 
project. 
 
2.1 Scope & Objectives 
2.1.1 Scope relating to e-ID Cards 
The e-ID cards which will be studied in this document will be those which generally 
fulfil the following requirements: 
• Serve as a national identity card and are issued by a government body to a 
uniquely defined citizen or resident 
• Performs I-A-S functionality, or a subset thereof 
• Is not a legally accepted passport, though it may support ePassport 
functions or standards 
2.1.2 Project Objectives  
Prior to starting this project it was agreed upon to accomplish the following 
objectives: 
 
• Review and analysis of existing and future e-ID standards and technologies 
 
• Review and analysis of national e-ID card schemes (in Europe), including 
their objectives and the policy drivers (motivation). 
 
• A review of the applications that e-ID cards enable, both for public policy 
purposes and commercial usage (planned & actual). 
 
• Lessons learned from existing e-ID card schemes (successes and failures) 
and determine whether new international schemes/standards will 
address past short-comings or not. 
2.1.3 Out of Scope 
e-ID cards in themselves are only as good at the systems and processes that 
support their issuance and usage. It is important to keep in mind that processes 
around enrolment of identities, implementing secure card delivery and ensuring 
usage, loss and re-issuance (card life-cycle management), as well as managing 
the application environment around the cards is critical to their success.  Despite 
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their importance, these topics will remain out of scope for this project. Additionally, 
other systems that support the e-ID cards, including readers, public key 
infrastructure, back-end systems, as well as necessary organisational aspects 
related to the e-ID card, though on occasion mentioned, will be out of scope for this 
project.  
 
Beyond the technical and process/operational aspects of an e-ID card system, a 
successful deployment is also dependent on a healthy user-adoption rate. In some 
cases, especially recent debate in the UK has shown [3], the aspects of violations 
to citizen’s privacy has illustrated signs of possible resistance. Likewise, the size of 
e-ID cards requires significant financial investment. Both the privacy and financial 
aspects of e-ID card deployment, while very important, will not be addressed in this 
study.  
 
To conclude, we will focus primarily on the components and information security 
aspects that are necessary to represent the e-ID on a card. We will thus only briefly 
mention, but not go into any detail, the other aspects of the e-ID card, such as 
additional physical security features, materials used or content printed/engraved 
onto the card.  
2.2 Motivation for e-ID Card Implementations 
In December 2004 at a European Committee for Standardisation / Information 
Society Standardization System (CEN/ISSS) workshop on eAuthentication [7], it 
was concluded that some of the primary drivers for supporting a national e-ID are 
as follows: 
 
• Need to support national e-Government services 
• Address common and global Identity Fraud (primarily an issue in the in 
financial/card-payments area) 
• Address national and pan-European anti-terrorism measures 
• Build a more “inclusive” European society, hence creating a “European 
Identity”  
• Stimulate emergence of new “intra-European” services in order to reduce 
costs of infrastructure (efficiency gains …) 
 
In addition to the above driving factors, various legislative drivers also exist. 
Examples include:  
 
• Ensuring National Security, such as through the European Directive on 
Money Laundering  [8] requiring stronger identification mechanisms to be 
used by financial institutions. 
• Enabling use of the European Directive on Electronic Signatures  - not only 
for purposes of serving as a tool to signing electronically, but also serving 
as a form of entity authentication [9]. 
• In some countries, particularity the UK, that don’t have an existing national 
identity card, put legal acts [10] in place to require national identity cards 
to be issued, including supporting some e-ID card functions. 
2.2.1 e-Government Services 
In this study we will focus primarily of the first driver identified by CEN/ISSS. This 
seems to be the focus of many e-ID card implementations, at least in terms of 
illustrating benefits to citizens. The focus on public, rather than private services, 
could be due to the fact that it is government institutions that are primarily driving 
the issuance of e-ID cards, rather than the private sector.  
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The European Commission’s benchmarking study [11] on electronic public services 
in Europe has shown a general increase in both the quantity of public services and 
their level of sophistication. 
 
Figure 1: Growth Rates in Online Sophistication 2001-2004 
 
Without going into detail, the method for defining online sophistication is split into 
four major stages, where it is only at the third stage onwards, that the need to use 
some authentication mechanism together with an intake of an official electronic 
document is required. It can be considered that at this more advanced stage of e-
Government service do e-ID cards play a significant role. The above table 
illustrates a general increase across Europe of government services becoming 
more and more sophisticated.  
 
 
Figure 2: Stages of Online Sophistication [11] 
An example of “sophistication” includes strong client authentication. E-ID cards are 
good vehicles in performing such functions. Hence, motivation for e-ID cards can 
be seen as enablers to perform more sophisticated e-Government applications. 
2.3 Information Security & e-ID Cards  
The three pillars of information security (confidentiality, integrity and availability) are 
just as relevant to e-ID cards as they are in any other information-centric system. 
We will briefly address these three pillars here, as the elements associated with 
them will occur throughout this project in various forms to ensure e-ID cards can be 
considered secure. 
 
Confidentiality:  
Whether using symmetric or asymmetric cryptography, the identity of which keys 
and related material is divulged to is critical. 
 
Integrity:  
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Using often the same cryptographic mechanisms as with supporting confidentiality, 
proving non-repudiation, or other aspects of integrity, relies significantly on being 
able to prove/ensure who has the ability to make legitimate changes. 
 
Availability: 
If your e-ID card is unavailable (e.g. problem with chip, network or loss of card), 
then the card becomes unable to operate as designed. It is critical to ensure that 
an e-ID card is designed in a robust manner. Prevention due to technical failure, 
intentional or otherwise, can lead to denial of services, for which availability is 
hence critical to maintain. 
 
For all three pillars, risks exist due to threats and vulnerabilities associated with the 
design and motivations of others. Aspects associated with failure of the above 
pillars will be addressed in the Risk Assessment chapter (Chapter 9). 
 
Given the focus on supporting e-Government services, one should note that 
Leithold et al [12] defined the key security requirements of an e-Government 
application as the ability to support the following attributes: 
 
• Entity Authentication – ensuring that the source of data supplied is only from 
the single individual as claimed  
• Data Origin Authentication – ensuring that the data supplied is indeed from 
the source being claimed 
• Confidentiality – ensuring that data supplied is not revealed to unauthorised 
parties 
• Non-repudiation – Ensuring that a false denial of having performed a 
transaction can proven 
In addition to these security requirements, Leithold et al pointed out [12] that, 
unlike in more commercial deployments, e-government applications are often 
mandated to illustrate aspects of being non-discriminatory towards their citizens 
in terms of accessibility and selection of technologies and standards. When e-
government applications are deployed to incorporate private parties or 
corporations (sometimes also referred to as public-private-partnerships), then 
e-government applications are also required to publish standardised 
(sometimes also referred to as open) interfaces. 
In a more traditional non-e-government scenario, [12] points out that these 
requirements are accomplished using special stationary, envelopes, hand-
written signatures, stamps, public notaries, as well as face-to-face encounters 
and use of registered postal mail.  
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3. INTRODUCING IDENTITY 
3.1 Identity  
Identity has a meaning in a variety of disciplines, including: 
 
• Philosophy 
• Mathematics 
• Social Science & Psychology 
• Business 
• Computer Science 
 
For purposes of this study, we will focus on the applicability of identity in the social 
sciences, mainly to identify individual persons, but also take a closer look at the 
use of identity from a computer science perspective, which attempts to represent 
the identity in an electronic form (though not necessarily confined to human 
beings). 
 
In Clarke’s 1994 paper on human identity [13], he attempts to define human 
identity, mainly as they pertain to information systems. His definition, after 
considerable discourse, is as follows:  
 
“human identification is the association of data with a particular human being.”  
 
This definition may seem quite obvious, but Clarke makes a point that information 
systems literature has actually not done a comprehensive job of defining how 
humans are identified in an electronic context. 
 
Clark provides [13] the following list  as an illustration of means by which an 
individual can be identified: 
 
Means of 
Identification  
Clarke’s Definition  Examples 
Appearance How the person looks Use of photographs on 
identity documents, facial 
biometrics 
Social behaviour How the person interacts 
with others 
Education records, mobile 
phone records, credit card 
statements, video 
surveillance data 
Names What the person is called 
by other people 
Name listed in national 
registry, on passports, birth 
certificates etc. 
Codes What the person is called 
by an organisation 
ID card numbers, social 
security numbers 
Knowledge What the person knows Passwords, PINs 
Tokens What the person has Smartcards, Secure ID 
cards  
Bio-dynamics What the person does Signature biometrics 
Natural 
physiography 
What the person is Most forms of biometrics: 
fingerprint, iris, retina, etc. 
Imposed physical 
characteristics 
What the person is now Height, weight 
Table 2: Means of Identification [13] 
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The national identity card is a tangible device which attempts to represent the 
above forms of identification. Specifically, the e-ID card attempts to use electronic 
data processing techniques (e.g. leveraging biometrics, public key infrastructures, 
secure storage mechanisms on smartcards etc), to perform a more accurate 
representation of a specific identity than more traditional paper or plastic card 
identity documents. 
 
3.2 Allegiance, Citizenship & Nationality  
As this study has a focus specifically on national identity cards. It is important to 
explore various aspects of what is understood by nationality, especially in the 
context of this term being used for e-ID cards. It might be helpful to look at the 
origin of nationality, as a concept, as this helps explains some of the motivation for 
deploying national identity cards.  
 
Allegiance 
Since ancient times, allegiance as a concept has existed “you had a king, you 
owed allegiance to him. It was as simple as that” [14]. English law started making 
references to the concept of allegiance starting as early as the thirteenth century. 
[14]. 
 
Citizenship 
In Roman times, law defined the terms of citizenship, which ultimately defined to 
whom you paid your taxes to. Citizenship could be obtained by enemy aliens 
through defection and collaboration. With the rights to citizenship, also came 
certain duties beyond paying taxes, most notably military service. A refusal to 
partake in the service would mean a revocation of the citizenship. Likewise, 
Romans would automatically lose their citizenship if the became prisoners of war 
[15] being referenced in [14]. Today, e-ID’s can be revoked as well (e.g. though 
published Certificate Revocation Lists) [16], though their motivation tends to be to 
due a change in the status of the card or contents as opposed to a revocation of 
citizenship! 
  
Nationality: 
Unlike citizenship, the concept of nationality is a more modern one. In fact it is not 
until the early nineteenth century that one seems to find initial references to 
nationality in the English language. According to Lloyd [14], it seems likely that the 
English borrowed the term from the French principe des nationalités. This term had 
its origins in revolutionary theory that “persons having a common language and 
culture form a nation and, as such, ought to be entitled to self-government as a 
state.” While this definition may seem to make sense, it caused confusion 
especially in Britain where holders of passports did not necessarily imply holders of 
British citizenship. In fact Lloyd illustrates how even until the end of the twentieth 
century, British passport holders could have one of the following descriptions to 
define their “nationality”, which did not necessarily equate to citizenship. 
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Commonwealth 
Citizen British Born Subject
British Subject by 
birth – wife of a 
British Subject
British Subject –
Citizen of the United 
Kingdom and 
Colonies
British Subject
British Subject by 
birth
British Subject 
without citizenship
British Subject –
the holder’s status 
under the 
Immigration Act 
1971 has not yet 
been defined
British Dependent 
Territory Citizen
British National 
(overseas)
British Citizen 
British Overseas 
Citizen
British Protected 
Person
 
Figure 3: British Nationality Types [14] 
Needless to say, such classification schema can cause quite some confusion, and 
does not make it any easier to then define the use of what types of persons, 
citizens or otherwise, should be eligible or required to hold a national identity card. 
The requirements for who is eligible (or in the case of certain countries, where 
mandatory), required to hold an identity card, tends to lie within national laws. In 
chapter 10 we will take a closer look at the legal environment associated with e-ID 
cards. 
 
Lloyd has pointed out [14] that “the passage of time has somehow fused and 
confused the ideas of allegiance, nationality and citizenship.” This fusion and 
confusion is increased further when incorporating the concepts of e-ID and e-ID 
cards, especially when pertaining to national e-ID cards, which imply nationality, 
but not necessarily citizenship.  
3.3 Identity documents 
While the focus of this project is on the electronic identity (e-ID) card and some of 
its related infrastructure, it helps to review the e-ID in a historical context. The 
concept of using a document to prove a credential for identification purposes has 
been known to go back as far as 1500 BC when “common people in Egypt were 
required to register themselves with the magistrates.” [14] This form of registration 
required not only names, but also other particulars to be registered. Interestingly, 
the same registration procedure was not only used for individuals, but also ships, 
that wished to leave a given port. This technique from the ancient Egyptians can 
thus also be seen as one of the earliest forms of a passport [17] attributed by [14]. 
3.3.1 The Passport  
The forerunner to the passport concerned such concepts as identity, nationality 
and allegiance, and were not only used for safe passage of individuals, but also in 
sixteenth century England for the safe passage of ships [14]. This use of identity 
documents to not only accredit persons, but also objects, brings up an interesting 
use of identity, something which today we are once again “re-discovering” as 
applied in the digital world. As an example, federated identity management 
systems are sometimes applied to services, rather than mere individuals. Also, we 
see certain e-IDs being used to represent business entities rather than mere 
individuals. 
 
According to Lloyd [14], today’s passport serves primarily two functions: establish 
the identity and the nationality of the holder. The e-ID card, which is a focus of this 
study, is primarily used to serve the primary function, and in addition to serve other 
functions, such as authentication and signing capabilities. However, as e-ID cards 
are issued by sovereign nations, and issued as national identity cards, they also 
represent the nationality of the issuer, though not necessarily of the holder. 
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Today a number of standards associated with passports are defined by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). These standards include, the 
specifications necessary for machine-readable travel documents (MRTD) [18], 
which most recently has included biometrics and other identity attributes stored on 
a smart card embedded into the passport. To this extent, the ICAO MRTD 
specifications are similar to e-ID card implementations. We sometimes see 
confusion between passports with biometrics (also referred to as ePassports) and 
e-ID card specifications. For example, during the definition of the UK ID Card, we 
have seen reference to the Identity Card and the ePassport as being practically the 
same thing: “when we record and store fingerprint biometrics (all 10 fingerprints for 
each person), we store a complete set in the National Identity Register (NIR) and a 
subset of these will be recorded on the card or the passport, in line with ICAO 
recommendations.” [19] 
 
What is clear though is that a passport, with the exception of Russia (and the 
former Soviet Union) which issues an “internal passport”, all passports are issued 
with the primary motivation to identify a person to enter and exit across 
international borders. Any other use of the passport is secondary. On the other 
hand, e-ID cards, or identity cards in general, have always had multiple primary 
purposes, depending on when and by whom they have been issued. 
3.3.2 Seed Identity Documents 
An identity document, when issued, is based on some form of verification that is 
performed. Usually a procedure is put in place and multiple attributes about an 
individual are put together to create a profile, as well as ensure that along the way 
nothing suspicious or contradictory is presented. 
 
A human identity can be said to be “created” when a person is born. At this stage, it 
is often the case that the birth is registered in a national birth and death registry, 
though the method mandated differs based on local legislation.  The registration of 
the birth within a registry enables the creation of a birth certificate. This document 
is often considered a “seed identity document”. In other words, with this document 
one can “prove” one’s existence and hence enable subsequent identity documents 
to be issued (e.g. drivers licenses or public library cards). Needless to say, this 
method of proof is subject to considerable vulnerabilities. As a result, often multiple 
“proofs” of identity are collected to generate a profile. Collectively, assuming no 
inconsistencies, these records suffice to create a single seed document, such as a 
passport. Examples include school, employment and medical records, as well as 
other forms of identification, which may have been created with- or without a seed 
document (for example a drivers license).  
3.4 The Electronic Identity (e-ID)  
While in subsequent chapters we will take a closer look at how e-IDs are 
implemented at a national level, Myhr [9] illustrated some of the key attributes 
necessary for a successful e-ID, taking into account a desire to define one for pan-
European acceptance. Note that the focus here is not so much on an e-ID card as 
on the definition of an electronic identity (e-ID) as it pertains to citizens.  
 
Attribute Definition 
Universality of 
coverage 
Every e-ID holder requires some identifier 
Uniqueness Every e-ID holder must have only a single identifier 
No two persons can have the same identifier 
Permanence The identifier should neither change, nor be 
changeable 
Exclusivity Using an identifier, will require no further form of 
identification to be presented 
Precision It should be sufficiently easy to detect differences 
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Attribute Definition 
between two similar identifiers in order to avoid errors 
Table 3: e-ID Attributes [9] 
 
This table does not actually mention anything that is unique to an electronic 
representation of identity. This is a critical aspect to keep in mind, as it is 
fundamental to how e-IDs are used, namely to fulfil the same requirements as 
using a physical identity. A classic example is the use of e-IDs for electronic 
signatures. Here the European Directive on Electronic Signatures [4] assures that 
EU citizens can use an e-ID (though that term is not used but rather the term 
“signatory” that carries a Secure Signature Creation Device, SSCD), to perform a 
signing of a document with same legal acceptance as a handwritten signature. For 
that to be the case, the above definition needs to be as closely aligned with the 
physical world, in terms of attribute applicability. 
 
An e-ID system is defined by the European Standards body CEN/ISSS as having 
[2]: 
 
 “the aim to guarantee the identity of a person (or a legal entity, e.g. a company) 
during the access to e-services and in order to provide the trust to the parties 
involved in the electronic transaction.”  
 
The e-ID card, as we study it in this paper, is generally seen as a tangible 
representation of the e-ID to support this e-ID system. 
 
It should be noted that efforts have been made to define electronic identities for 
more commercial or closed user group systems. These forms of e-ID are out of 
scope for this project, though some of their best practices, such as PKI 
implementation techniques, relevant technologies and standards are sometimes 
adopted for national e-ID card schemes (see Chapter 10). 
3.5 The National e-ID Card 
As this study is about analysing the implementation of e-ID Cards across Europe, it 
becomes necessary to define the e-ID Card itself. In the above sections we have 
taken a closer look at the various definitions and forms of identity, as well as 
electronic representation of identity (e-ID) and the systems that support this e-ID. 
The concept of electronic identity, however, is much more recent than identity 
documents. As a result, when references to e-ID Cards are made, there tend to be 
two schools. One school of thought looks at the e-ID Card as a token representing 
an electronic identity (e-ID). Another school sees the e-ID Card as more of an 
extension of a traditional identity card that supports a chip, which may or may not 
contain an e-ID. 
 
Setting these two schools aside, we will provide the following simplified definition of 
a national e-ID card, in order to understand the scope of this study: 
 
A national electronic identity (e-ID) card is a physical representation of a human 
or corporate identity, which is able to serve one or more of the following three 
functions: Identification, Authentication and Signing (I-A-S). While these 
functions may be possible through physical presentation of the card and the 
use of visual checks, what makes the card electronic, is the ability to perform I-
A-S functionality electronically, often simultaneously striving to increase the 
security and integrity of the function. 
 
Using today’s technology, the e-ID card generally is a piece of plastic or 
polycarbonate containing a contact- or contactless smartcard chip. For purposes of 
this study, we will assume that the core computational engine on the card will be a 
smartcard. One should keep in mind, however, that European legislation as it is 
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defined today [4], speaks of a more generic Secure Signature Creation Devices, 
rated than explicitly requiring a smartcard to be used. 
3.5.1 Secure Signature Creation Devices (SSCD) 
The European Directive on electronic signatures [4], which is a key driver for 
issuing e-IDs in many European countries, defines the requirements for “Secure 
Signature Creation Devices” (SSCD). In today’s technology, the SSCD tends to be 
some form of smart card. The form factor for e-IDs tend to be defined by ISO 
standards for identity cards, but in some jurisdictions, such as Austria, the form 
factor is not seen as critical, such that mobile phone SIM cards and USB fobs are 
also seen as legally valid carriers of e-ID. 
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4. E-ID CARD APPLICATIONS 
4.1 Application Users 
Depending on the type of application where an e-ID Card comes to use, different 
users interact with the card. At a high level, the following are the key users of e-ID 
cards: 
 
User Role 
Identity Provider & 
Issuer 
Generally a government agency (or trusted third party) 
that verifies and collects the necessary credentials in 
order to issue an e-ID card. In addition to issuing the 
card, the identify provider generally also carries some 
form of accountability/liability/assurance with regards 
the authenticity/validity of the identity.  
Civil Servant Government personnel / public officials that handle the 
e-ID card for various purposes  
Private Citizens The primary holder, user of the e-ID card. The e-ID 
card is generally issued in their name. 
Business 
Representatives 
Identities that are not private citizens, but that 
represent legal entities, such as corporations. 
Other identities Identities not covered in the above categories 
Table 4: e-ID Users 
4.2 Base Functionality 
As mentioned in the Introduction (Chapter 2), and is initially identified by Fiat and 
Shamir [5], the primary purpose of an e-ID card are to perform variations of three 
key functions: Identification, Authentication and Signature (I-A-S).  
 
The applications illustrated in this chapter related to applications that perform these 
functions. 
4.3 Government Applications  
The 2005 CapGemini benchmarking study, conducted on behalf of the European 
Commission, of public services online [11], illustrated most public services as fitting 
into the following twenty categories, of which 60% are focussed on use by citizens, 
and the rest by businesses. 
 
Citizens Businesses 
Income Tax Social Contribution for Employees 
Job Search Corporate Tax 
Social Security Benefits 
(unemployment benefits, child 
allowances, medical costs & student 
grants) 
VAT 
Personal Documents (passports, 
drivers licenses) 
Registration of a New Company 
Vehicle Registration Submission of Data to the Statistical 
Office 
Building Permits Application Customs Declarations 
Declaration to Police Environmental-related Permits 
Public Libraries Public Procurements 
Birth & Marriage Certificates  
Enrolment in Higher Education  
Announcement of Moving  
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Citizens Businesses 
Health-related Services  
Table 5: Public Services [11] 
 
The study [11] took a closer look at the level of online sophistication for each 
category, and which ones were more likely to incorporate the use of e-IDs (i.e. 
requiring stage 3 or above). Some of the key findings from this study were as 
follows: 
 
• Online sophistication of public services is much higher (72%) for the original 
EU countries, as opposed to those who joined in 2004 (53%) 
• Public services for businesses are generally (77%) more sophisticated than 
those for citizens (57%) 
 
The CapGemini study also identified a trend when clustering online services, by the 
type of impact the service would have. The four clusters were identified as: 
 
Service Cluster Definition 
Income-generating Generates income for government, usually in the form 
of taxes and social contributions (e.g. income tax, VAT, 
corporate taxes etc.) 
Registration Services related to submission of data for completion of 
administrative obligations (e.g. car registrations, 
submissions to statistics bureau, company registrations 
Returns The provision of services in return for taxes and public 
contributions (e.g. public procurements, social security 
benefits, health related services etc.) 
Permits & Licenses Provision of documents provided by government bodies 
(e.g. enrolment in schools, environment-related permits, 
building permissions etc.) 
Table 6: Online Services Clusters 
Overall, the income generating cluster had the highest levels of online 
sophistication (88%), while all other categories were around 50-60%. This clear 
gap between levels shows in a way that “services go where the money is.” 
4.3.1 Deployed e-Government Applications  
The following is a listing of e-Government applications that are presently deployed 
across Europe where e-ID cards can be used. This table is not meant to be an 
exhaustive listing, but rather provide a representative sampling of the diversity with 
regards to the types of applications that are today e-ID card enabled. 
 
Application Description Location 
Age Verification Age verification for cigarette vending 
machines 
Italy 
Checking Personal 
(Registered) Data 
Check that data in National Registry is 
accurate and ability to request changes 
Finland, 
Estonia, 
Belgium  
Child Alimony File application Austria 
Child Pornography Registration of case Austria 
City of Vantaa Online 
Services  
 
Online services, such as Social 
assistance, day-care and rental 
apartment applications with Vantaa 
municipal authorities  
Finland 
Criminal offence 
registration 
Reporting offences (civil and penal) to 
police 
Italy 
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Application Description Location 
Disability Insurance Application of insured widowers upon 
death of spouse 
Austria 
e-grandparents Electronic meeting place where children 
can communicate with “e-grandparents”  
Finland 
Electronic Birth 
Registration 
Maternity hospitals register newborns 
online on day of birth 
Finland 
Employment Office's 
vocational adult 
education  
Apply online for vocational education  Finland 
e-Tickets Purchase tickets for public transport Estonia 
Internet Voting Voting in elections online Estonia 
Municipal tax  Filing of municipal tax forms Austria 
Notification of move Notify Post Office and Population 
Information System of change in 
address 
Finland 
Online service for 
general housing 
allowance  
Housing allowance applicant can check 
whether housing allowance application 
has been processed, the amount of 
allowance and from when the allowance 
has been granted 
Finland 
Online service for 
parental allowances 
Parents who have applied for maternal, 
special maternal, paternal or parental 
allowances may use service for tracking 
their own allowance data 
Finland 
Online Tax filing Authenticate and digitally sign online tax 
submissions 
Estonia, 
Belgium 
Post Office's NetPosti 
service 
Receive electronic bills and letters, 
change own online service contact 
information, send an ePostcard 
Finland 
Request 
administrative 
documents 
For example request issuance of a birth 
certificate 
Belgium 
Residence Change Notification of change in address Italy 
Retirement pension 
calculation 
Calculate and estimate of retirement 
pension and predated retirement 
pension based on employment history 
Finland 
Retirement, including 
early retirements 
Registration with municipality of status 
change 
Austria 
Secure email Send authenticated and encrypted 
emails – email address is assigned for 
life and associated with e-ID card 
(stored in certificate) 
Estonia 
Social Insurance 
Institution of Finland's 
online service 
Sickness allowance or a special care 
allowance customer can check whether 
their application has been processed, 
the amount of allowance and from when 
the allowance has been granted 
Finland 
Telephone Bill Check telephone bill online Estonia 
Table 7: Deployed Application Landscape [20], [21], [22] 
Today most governments promote the number of e-ID cards (Chapter 5) they have 
issued, or the number of applications that are e-ID card “enabled” (see table 
above). However, there is practically no statistics, and certainly no overview study, 
that provided a measurement of success based on usage. It is unclear, for example 
whether popular or high-use functions such as tax submission, are seeing an 
increase in submissions with e-ID cards, not to speak of an analysis regarding the 
reasoning (such as convenience or other added benefits unavailable offline).   
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The Mondis Study on Identity Management in eGovernment [21] is one of the more 
comprehensive pan-European overviews. However, it only mentions quantitative 
usage of e-ID cards in passing. One figure which is worth mentioning, however, is 
that in Estonia, which has a very high e-ID card penetration rate, 65% of persons 
declared their taxes online. However, they did so using their online banking 
applications rather than their e-ID cards. This is due to the fact that banks issued e-
Banking authentication mechanisms before the e-ID card launched, which has lead 
to the e-ID card not bringing added value to a population already accustomed to 
online authentication using their banks (including to access government portals). 
 
4.3.2 Non-Governmental and Other Applications 
 
While until today the actual success in terms to user acceptance and uptake of e-
IDs has been limited, especially in what is referred to as the A2C (administration to 
citizen) domain, one should not disregard the secondary usage effects of e-IDs.  
 
In some cases, for example in Estonia, the e-ID has laid the foundation for an 
advanced (e-)ID card. This card, while not necessarily having considerable daily 
usage by citizens for electronic signing purposes, as primarily designed, it has 
become a trusted citizen ID card for more conventional purposes, such as name 
and age verification – not to speak of acting as an accepted machine-readable 
document replacing the need for a passport at certain foreign borders. 
 
It seems that at present, the only use of e-ID cards in non-Government sector 
comes in two flavours: 
• Use of e-ID card as an SSCD to digitally and electronically sign documents 
with legal validity 
• Collaboration with financial institutions to share authentication infrastructure 
(e.g. PKI). This seems popular in some Nordic countries.  
 
Probably the only notable exception is Austria, while not having a single e-ID card, 
allows a nationally valid e-ID card to be issued on banking/ATM cards (Chapter 5). 
 
The focus of this study is on Europe, were we can conclude that there really are no 
good examples of non-Government applications for e-ID cards, beyond secondary 
use as a physical identifier. As will be illustrated in the next chapter with a review of 
the Malaysian e-ID card, MyKad, there are examples of the e-ID card serving a 
more multi-purpose function, including non-Government applications. In fact it was 
shown there to be of importance to get private-sector participation to increase the 
adoption rates. Sadly, this approach does not seem to be taken in Europe, which 
might explain the limited success of e-ID cards used for electronic transactions. 
 
4.4 Possible Future/other Applications 
As mentioned above, the focus of e-ID cards today is almost exclusively of their 
use in operating e-Government applications. Their ability to securely authenticate 
citizens in the private sector could be significant, though until now there has been 
no active definition of such scenarios. One exception is banking, which due to the 
banks driving e-Banking applications in the early 1990’s put their own strong 
authentication mechanisms in place before e-ID initiatives were launched. In 
general though, their systems have been of a proprietary mechanism. In the future, 
though, authentication using a national e-ID card for banking could be possible.  
 
In addition to incorporating existing stand-alone e-ID cards, such as heath cards, it 
is the secondary use of e-ID cards that shows the potentially unlimited examples of 
e-ID application use. 
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A few examples of innovative future applications being adopted, include: 
• Access to Public Wireless LANS / Metronets  [23] 
• Use e-ID for e-Voting (trials already performed in Estonia) 
• Encryption – while the use of smartcards for encryption is an easy extension, 
we have not seen this use of e-ID cards for a number of reasons: 
? Requires an additional (encryption) certificate – this is an additional 
(certificate) management task required 
? No mandating legislation seems to be in place 
? The demand does not seem to exist – conventional alternatives are 
already present. 
? While privacy is being dealt with, mainly from a data retention 
perspective, the encryption of communications does not seem to 
crop up in existing e-ID Card literature. 
• Access for Gambling and conducing other activities that require age-
verification 
It should also be mentioned that the EU Directive on electronic signatures [4] 
defines the validity of digital signature with pseudonyms, however e-ID cards today 
do not seem to support this type of functions. 
4.4.1 Identity Mixer 
Today’s “traditional” certificates and signatures used for e-ID cards generally 
require card holders to hand over all attributes contained within a certificate. For 
example, X.509v3 certificates in Belgium [16] divulge name and the certificate 
serial number. As will be illustrated with the Austrian interoperability demo in the 
following chapter, this can be a practical piece of information to uniquely identify a 
citizen. Specifically, looking at a scenario where a citizen wishes to provide strongly 
authenticated attributes, such as eligible age to conduct a business transaction, but 
does not need to divulge any personally identifying data, such as those found in 
the X.509v3 certificates, present technology reaches a limitation. Today, such a 
scenario can not be implemented using available e-ID cards, despite European 
privacy legislation encouraging some form of “data minimisation”, since the e-ID 
application is unable to be discretionary (i.e. minimising) in which content from 
within the certificate to divulge.  
 
IBM Research has developed the Identity Mixer [24] [25], also known as Idemix, 
which is an anonymous credential system. The Idemix is based on anonymous 
credentials instead of X.509v3 certificates for certifying attributes. A credential is a 
list of attributes signed with a specific signature scheme. The signature scheme 
allows a holder of a credential to reveal a subset of the attribute information of the 
credential within a transaction.  For example, the birth date attribute of a credential 
can be used to established qualified age categories without actually revealing the 
value of the birth date, which in a small population sample could reveal the actual 
identity. As another key property, multiple transactions conducted with the same 
credential are unlinkable to each other unless the revealed attribute information 
allows for linking of the transactions. This approach reduces the amount of 
released data to a minimum, thus making the solution more privacy friendly, 
especially if one compares to how X.509v3 certificates would be used today. In 
addition, this approach, as we will see in the following chapter, is completely 
different with regards to addressing unlinkability by the Austrian scheme. 
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5. NATIONAL E-ID CARD IMPLEMENTATIONS 
In this study, rather than conducting a comprehensive review of all e-ID card 
schemes in Europe, we have decided to select a few illustrative examples that 
show the diversity of e-ID card implementations.  
5.1 Austrian Bürgerkarte 
Austria has a population of around 8 million inhabitants. Since passing of the e- 
Government act in March 2004, over 10 million e-IDs have been issued. This 
number may sound deceptive, as the Austrian concept of an e-ID does not 
necessarily equate to an e-ID Card. In fact every ATM card issued since March 
2005 [21] in Austria has a built-in Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD), as 
defined by the European Directive on electronic signatures [4], and is capable of 
being activated as a citizen card. 
 
The Austrian e-ID, unlike many other initiatives around Europe, is not so much 
focussed on being a single card. Of all implementations studied for this project, the 
Austrians seem to strive towards having the most technology/vendor agnostic 
implementation. The e-ID scheme in Austria is supported by multiple physical 
tokens: Bürgerkarte (translated as Citizens Card), which is not only issued as a 
national e-ID card called e-Card but also bank cards that are issued by local banks, 
A1’s telecom infrastructure, leveraging the smart-card functionality embedded into 
A1-issued SIM cards, and finally tokens are also issued as a USB dongle [2], [26]. 
Actually, the government, while having very stringent regulations on who can issue 
an e-ID identifier, provides significant freedom with regards to who can issue the 
card itself.  
 
Since the activation service of certificates started in November 2005, about 3,200 
e-Card certificates have been activated. The volume of A1 and the A-Trust (private 
sector certificate authority) certificates activated is not public knowledge. By the 
end of 2006, e-Card wanted to reach a target of 50,000 activated certificates. If one 
includes the 8 million target cards to be issued (one per citizen), the number of 
bank cards with e-ID functionality, and other forms of e-ID to be issued, the total 
number of e-IDs expected to be in circulation by the end of 2007 is expected to 
reach 15 million [27]. 
 
The primary motivation of the Bürgerkarte has been to increase the adoption of e-
Government services by providing a framework to enable electronic signing and 
identification. It should be kept in mind that the Austrian interpretation of the 
European Directive on electronic signatures [4] does not assume a unique identity 
associated with an electronic signature. As a result, the supporting of electronic 
signatures and identification are treated as two separate functions. This strict 
separation is especially helpful when dealing with interoperability towards 
supporting other countries, as “foreign” identities can be just as easily accepted 
within Austria to conduct electronic signing functions. 
5.1.1 The Austrian Citizen Card Concept 
5.1.1.1 Requirements 
The Austrian Citizen Card concept was defined as a framework to fulfil two key 
requirements for the Austrian e-ID [26]: 
• A mechanism to make electronic signatures in Austria legally accepted and 
compliant to the European Directive on Electronic Signatures [4] 
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• In order to fulfil the first requirement, where a unique identity is not required, 
the Austrian Citizen Concept was defined to also support a unique 
identification procedure, while still adhering to data protection legislation 
 
From the initial design of the Citizen Card Concept, ensuring a lack of linkability for 
data protection/privacy reasons was seen as critical.  While there is no legal 
definition of linkability, [28] references the ISO 15408 (Evaluation criteria for IT 
Security) technical definition, providing some insight into this concept: 
 
"[Unlinkability] ensures that a user may make multiple uses of resources or 
services without others being able to link these uses together. [...] Unlinkability 
requires that users and/or subjects are unable to determine whether the same user 
caused certain specific operations in the system." 
 
Performing a level of unlinkability is provided to a certain extent by the Austrian 
Citizen Card Concept, through the use of source and sector specific PINs, which 
are described below. 
 
The definition of identity in an Austrian card requires a closer review, as this is 
specific to the Austrian context, as well as being a key enabler for interoperability of 
foreign-issued e-ID cards. The Austrian e-Government Act of March 2004 defined 
two types of identity: Unique Identity and Recurring Identity. 
 
Identity Type Definition 
Unique Identity Designation of a specific person (or data subject) using 
features that can enable the person can be unmistakably 
distinguished from all other possible persons. 
Recurring Identity Designation of a specific person (or data subject), which 
enables the person to be uniquely identified if presenting 
themselves again in the future. There is no guarantee, or 
use of techniques, to ensure this person is unique amongst 
all possible persons.  
Table 8: Austrian Identity Types [29] 
What the above definitions of identity mean in practical terms is that e-IDs, 
regardless of whether being a Unique or Recurring form of identity, both can be 
considered valid for generating legally compliant digital signatures, and thus being 
a representative identity for an Austrian e-ID. 
5.1.1.2 National Registers 
All entities represented by a Bürgerkarte are stored in one of the following national 
registers: 
 
National Register Function 
Central Residents Register (CRR) Central register for all Austrian citizens 
(Identifier/PIN publicly available) 
Commercial Register (CR) Register of all commercial entities in Austria 
Register of Associations (RA) Register of all non-commercial associations 
in Austria 
Supplemental Registers (supR) Contains citizens not enrolled in CRR, such 
as expats, foreigners, “others” 
Table 9: National Registers in Austria [29], [30] 
5.1.1.3 The Source PIN (sPIN) 
Each entity in the above registers is given a unique identifier, which we will call a 
Personally Identifiable Number (PIN). This PIN, however, is not used as an 
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identifier by identity processors, despite it being public knowledge. Rather, a 
Source PIN (sPIN) is generated, using the PIN as an input variable. The sPIN can 
only be generated by a central government source PIN Registration Authority, and 
under the protectorate of the Data Protection Commissioner [29]. The sPIN is 
generated by converting the PIN to binary, adding a secret seed value, applying a 
3DES encryption and BASE-64 encoding the value.  
 
 
Figure 4: Generating the Source PIN (sPIN) [30] 
Only the entity owner, to whom the sPIN is issued, maintains a copy of this 
identifier (e.g. on their Bürgerkarte). For data protection purposes, not even the 
sPIN Registration Authority maintains a copy of the sPIN. A new sPIN can only be 
re-calculated again under the supervision on the Austrian Data Protection 
Commissioner. 
 
In parallel, a SAML-based XML data structure is stored in the Bürgerkarte, known 
as the Identity Link. The Identity Link is actually a certificate signed by the sPIN’s 
Registration Authority. This certificate acts to bind a citizen’s public key to the sPIN. 
Specifically, the certificate contains the citizen’s name, date of birth, the sPIN and 
the public keys [29]. One can thus say that the sPIN acts primarily to identify a 
citizen, while the Identity Link acts to authenticate the citizen [30]. 
5.1.1.4 The Sector Specific PIN (ssPIN) 
The use of the sPIN as an identifier, however, still poses a risk associated with 
regards to linkability. Were an individual to use their sPIN as an identifier to each 
identity processor, it would be possible to link the same sPIN across processors. 
For this reason, the sPIN is further processed to create a Sector Specific PIN 
(ssPIN). Each ssPIN that is generated, is used for only a single identity processor, 
such as a single government administration [30].  The ssPIN is generated by 
applying a one-way hash function (based on SHA-1) to the sPIN and a sector 
specific identifier (e.g. tax authorities or social security department). This technique 
serves two purposes. First, a government department (or any other identity 
processor) is unable to determine the sPIN of the entity. Second, since the 
department uses the ssPIN as the unique identifier solely for their administrative 
department, they would be unable to perform a cross-search with other 
departments that would be relying on a different ssPIN [29]. 
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Figure 5: Generating the Sector Specific PIN (ssPIN) [30] 
5.1.1.5 Interoperability 
With regards to interoperability, the integration of Belgian, Estonian, Finnish and 
Italian cards into the Austrian Citizen Card has been proven possible [27]. 
 
While presently only at a prototype stage, the Austrian government has 
demonstrated that both existing Finnish and Italian e-ID cards can be used in an 
interoperable manner in an Austrian context. Specifically what this means is that 
foreign e-ID cards that contain a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD), as 
defined in Annex III of the European Directive on Electronic Signatures [4], as well 
as support the  PKCS #11 interface (a Public Key Cryptography Standard related 
to generic interfaces to hardware tokens such as smartcards), are able to be 
accepted in the same way that an Austrian e-ID SSCD is accepted.  
 
In the case of the Italian e-ID, the tax identifier which is unique to each citizen and 
accessible though the card is used to identify the citizen. This unique identifier is 
hashed and encoded to create a Substitute Source PIN, also known as a 
Subsource PIN. This new PIN is legally accepted in the same manner as the sPIN 
of a genuine Austrian e-ID. 
 
The Finnish e-ID does not supply access to a unique identifier in the way that the 
Italian e-ID does. To get around this limitation of uniquely identifying the Finnish 
cardholder, the serial number on the electronic signature certificate of the Finnish 
e-ID card is used.  
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Figure 6: Generation of sPINs from foreign e-IDs [30] 
There are primarily two factors which make supporting foreign e-IDs a unique 
proposition of the Austrian implementation: 
 
• The Austrian definition of identity, specifically Recurring Identity, which by 
the Austrian e-Government Act of March 2004 makes use of a non-
unique identity, such as Italian tax ID or Finnish certificate serial number 
as legally acceptable to generate source PINs [29] 
• The lack of a single identity issuer, means that in the same way that an 
Austrian ATM card equipped with an SSCD is legally accepted for 
representing an e-ID, so is one that is issued by foreign countries 
 
To conclude, the Austrian e-ID is in a league of it’s own in that there is no true 
concept of a single card, yet it is set-up in such a way that it performs many of the 
functions of an e-ID card, particularly related to digital and electronic signing 
purposes.  The Austrians have also promoted their card as being privacy friendly 
from the outset, the focus has however been of lack of linkability rather than 
addressing specific privacy legislation (e.g. Data Protection Directive). Last, but not 
least, the Austrians, albeit only an initial attempt, have been the only ones so far in 
Europe to demonstrate some form of interoperability with regards to foreign e-ID 
cards. 
 
5.2 Belgian Personal Identity Card (BELPIC) 
Belgium has a population of approximately 10.5 million inhabitants. As of May 1, 
2006, 2,712,825 e-ID cards were delivered. As each chip is designed to hold two 
certificates, the number of activated certificates is around double the number of 
issued cards at 4,137,314. By the end of 2007, the Belgian authorities plan to have 
issued 5 million cards – i.e. to roughly half the population. [27] 
 
The Belgian e-ID, also known as the Belgian Personal Identity Card (BELPIC), is 
issued to all citizens of Belgium. A foreigner’s card also exists, but as of now does 
not have the functionality of an e-ID card. Work is underway to make changes to 
government systems to support non-Belgian nationals in the future [21]. For 
children below the age of 6 a “Kids card” is issued without any certificates. For 
children below the age of 18 a Kids card only with an authentication certificate is 
issued. From the age of 12, the e-IDs are distributed together with a card reader so 
that children, a form of early adopters to information technology, can use the e-IDs 
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to perform simple transactions, such as authenticating clients to websites and for 
access control purposes, such as public libraries. Once children reach the adult 
age of 18, a complete e-ID card is issued containing both the authentication and 
non-repudiation (signature) certificates. [16] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Belgian e-ID Front and Back [31] 
The Belgian e-ID card conforms to ISO specifications regarding card sizes (ID-1). 
The card is manufactured using polycarbonate, which explains the use of a black & 
white image. There are other physical security features, such as changeable laser 
image (CLI), Optical Variable Ink (OVI) and other forms of laser engraving which 
are hard and/or expensive to tamper with or forge. In addition, the card’s backside 
bottom has a machine-readable text zone that is compliant to ICAO specifications. 
As a result the e-ID card can also be used in certain countries that accept MRTD 
ID cards for border control purposes. [16] 
 
The contents of the chip were designed prior to completion of ePassport 
specifications. As a result the chip does not contain any ICAO MRTD functionality. 
The BELPIC contains two key pairs for each adult citizen. The key pairs are 
activated during the initialisation process of the card. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 8, an e-ID PKI can serve multiple functions. In the case of 
the BELPIC, there are three primary purposes for which key pairs are generated: 
• Authenticating the Citizen – this is represented through an X.509v3 
authentication certificate 
• Digitally Signing – Advanced electronic signatures, complying to the 
European Directive, are represented through a second X.509v3 qualified 
signature certificate 
• Card Authentication – A third key pair is generated to ensure the authenticity 
of the card. In this case no certificate is generated, rather the public key 
is known to the National Registry (RRN) 
The mentioned certificates above comprise part of the Identity File, which is about 
160 bytes in total size and stored in the chip’s EEPROM. The chip has a unique 
identifier. In addition, certain citizen specific identifiers are stored on the chip, such 
as names, date and location of birth, gender, nationality and card specific 
information, such as the card identifier number, validity dates and a SHA-1 hash of 
the citizen’s photograph. This data is subsequently signed using a digital signature 
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issued by the RRN. In addition to the Identity File, a few other components are 
stored in the card: 
• The citizen’s Address File (approx. 120 bytes). In order to save on the 
administrative effort of issuing a new card each time someone changes 
address, the address information is only stored in electronic format on 
the card’s chip 
• A JPEG image of the citizen (approx. 3 Kb) 
• Digital signatures of the Identity File and the citizen’s Address File 
 
The smartcard contained within the BELPIC runs on a JavaCard operating 
platform, which enables a high level of security to be incorporated, as well as 
running multiple applications on the same chip (see Chapter 7 for details on 
JavaCard). Mainly from a card management perspective, this enables only the 
National Registry (i.e. appointed government authority) to make any authorised 
changes to card contents.  
 
The following table illustrates a breakdown of hardware components on the 
BELPIC chip: 
 
Component Specification 
Card Type Infineon issued CryptoFlex SLE66CX322P (32K) 
JavaCard 
CPU 16-bit microcontroller 
Crypto co-processor 1100-bit crypto engine, based on RSA 
112-bit crypto-accelerator, based on DES 
 
ROM (for OS) 136kB, including Java Virtual Machine 
EEPROM (for applications 
and data) 
32 KB  
RAM  5 KB 
Table 10: BELPIC Chip components [16] 
Though somewhat different in their approach, the Belgian card carries similarities 
with the Finnish and Estonian e-ID card in that all three national solutions rely on 
the use of X.509v3 certificates [32]. The use of the X.509 standard defines the 
structure of a digital certificate. Together with the issuing of certificates is also the 
ability (and necessity) to operate Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). The Belgian 
CRL’s are public records published on the internet. Naturally, the entire system can 
be compromised in the event that a Certificate Authority (CA) is compromised. For 
this reason, Authority Revocation Lists (ARLs) are also published, though as of 
2006 [31] this list has never been used. 
 
It should also be noted that the use of the electronic signing features that come 
with the e-ID card are not mandatory. Hence, while it is mandatory to have a card, 
citizens can opt-in/out depending on whether they wish to use this e-ID functionality 
of the card. This has an additional impact on whether a compromised card is 
published on the CRL or not (non-activation of the card means it will never be 
published on the CRL). In the event that a card is reported lost or stolen, it is 
temporarily put in a suspend status for up to seven days. After this period the card 
is either reported found, in which case it regains an active status, or it is considered 
permanently revoked, thus requiring a new card to be issued. 
 
It should noted that the usual challenges faced with digital signatures and their 
validity also exists in the Belgian context. In order to assure long-term validity of a 
digital signature generated using the e-ID card, despite it being revoked or expired 
in the future, a Belgian digital signature is considered valid “forever.” The 
conditions for a permanently valid digital signature are as follows: 
• Data is digitally signed 
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• Digital signature is part of the data  
• The signers certificate is stored (maintained) 
• Validity of the signer’s certificate (at time of signing) exists 
• The signature has a valid verification time stamp 
If the above criteria are met, then the digital signature is still considered valid and 
hence non-repudiation and authenticity can be assured. [16] 
 
Unlike the Austrian e-ID, which from the onset has attempted to be privacy-friendly 
through use of unlinkability schemes, the Belgian e-ID card has not addressed 
privacy. No privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) have been implemented, 
through there is discussion of including them in future enhancements of the card 
[31]. 
 
Also unlike the Austrian model described above, interoperability is still an issue not 
completely addressed by the BELPIC. Present focus is on interoperability of e-IDs 
across different administrative units within Belgium (federal, regional, community 
and municipality). There has not been any work on interoperability activities with 
regards to foreign e-ID cards [21]. 
5.3 United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom is one of few countries without a national ID card, though they 
have existed twice in past. The motivation for issuing an e-ID card is also very 
different from the above two examples. Rather than focus on representing an e-ID 
in order to electronically sign or authenticate, the focus revolves around a number 
of topics which shifts, depending on the political climate from reducing crime, fraud 
(identity), fighting terrorism, and entitlement. This politicisation of the UK Identity 
card has lead to significant public debate. The UK Identity Card scheme though is 
more than just a card, it is actually the role of the National Identity Register (NIR) 
which is more critical, and in some cases deemed controversial.  
 
The following is a high-level summary [3] of the order of events that have lead to 
the existing UK Identity Card scheme: 
 
1. 2002 UK government undertakes a public consultation regarding “Entitlement 
Cards” – see Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud: A Consultation Paper  [33]  
2. 29 Nov 2004 – Government issues Identity Cards Bill, which after being 
debated in both houses, is suspended, pending 2005 elections. 
3. March 2005: London School of Economics (LSE) issues Interim Report 
4. June 2005: LSE issues Main Report 
5. Following the elections, a slightly revised form of the bill was presented to 
House of Commons on 25 May 2005 
6. November 9 2005: Home Office releases 60% of cost model based on KPMG 
review. Also, the minister responsible for the bill makes clarifications regarding 
the government’s cost estimates as only including those affecting the Home 
Office operationally (i.e. set-up costs and those affecting other government 
departments were excluded). 
7. January and March 2006: LSE publishes additional reports 
8. Bill becomes law on 30 March 2006 
 
Without going into the details of the debate, the above sequence of events 
illustrates the more complex implementation sequence that has taken the UK to 
lead to the set-up of an ID Card– all of these without the use of the card for any 
form of electronic or digital signing purposes. The focus is clearly on authentication, 
and that too for persons in front of a verification terminal, as opposed to online in a 
possibly remote location. 
 
UK Scheme in Brief: 
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• Available to all residents in UK above age of 16 
• Includes multiple documents: biometrics visas & documents for foreigners, 
enhanced passports, ID cards for British citizens 
• Income will be generated from charging for certain services (income 
generator) 
• From 2009 Identity and Passport Service (IPS) will issue ID cards for British 
citizens 
Core component of the UK scheme is the National Identity Register (NIR). This is 
covered in more detail in Chapter 6. The key service of the UK e-ID card is to 
authenticate a cardholder. This can be done through various schemes, depending 
on how strong an authentication is required:  
 
Authentication 
Service 
Description 
Visual check Only a manual check of the content printed on the identity 
card (no electronic communication) 
Card chip 
authentication 
Verification of authenticity of chip (using card reader) 
PIN-check Require cardholder to enter a (secret) PIN to authenticate 
cardholder 
Online/Telephone 
verification 
Verification using online / telephone mechanisms 
Biometric check Require cardholder to verify their fingerprint biometric for 
comparison to the enrolled biometric. It is not clear 
whether this verification is done using a mach-on-card 
(MOC) verification or whether a check with the NIR is 
performed 
Information 
Provision 
Provisioning of personal details to third parties, for 
example to cascade a change in address to other 
government departments 
Table 11: UK e-ID Card Authentication Services [19] 
The services listed above are really only serving Identification and Authentication 
purposes. The S part of the I-A-S model is clearly missing from the UK scheme. 
This can possibly be explained because the UK (along with Ireland) does not have 
an existing national identity card, which would serve some of this basic functionality 
already. From the considerable debate revolving around the UK ID Card scheme, 
the fact that it is difficult for public authorities to know who their citizens are, 
illustrates that in the UK there is a drive to first “solve” this problem. The passing of 
the UK Identity Cards Act [10] in 2006 was the first step. Interestingly enough, 
despite considerable debate and activities around the use of e-ID cards to act as 
an SSCD, this discussion has not been conducted in the Strategic Action Plan for 
the National Identity Scheme, which is the officially mandated road-map for the UK 
e-ID card.  
 
There are however two observations that are unique to the UK scheme, which 
should be noted: 
 
• The role of PKI is emphasised as a form to ensure card and back-end 
security. This infrastructure, however, is not seen as an enabler to 
digitally sign electronic documents as other e-ID card schemes across 
Europe 
• There is mention of the cards being EMV compatible, i.e. that the UK ID 
Cards can be read from a conventional payment card reader. This, while 
technically possible poses some interesting questions regarding the use 
of the EMV technology for an unintended purpose. 
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As this scheme is still under development, it is important to keep a close eye on 
further developments.  
5.4 Malaysian MyKad 
In 2006 it was estimated [34] that Malaysia had a population size of 26.64 million 
inhabitants. A government status update in 2006 claimed [35] that by the end of 
2005 a complete migration from paper based ID to the September 2001 launched 
electronic ID had taken place.  
 
 
Figure 8: Malaysian MyKad e-ID Card (front) [36] 
Unlike other national e-ID cards, such as those European ones reviewed earlier in 
this section, the Malaysian e-ID card, often referred to as the MyKad, has taken a 
somewhat different approach. It is also one of the earliest forms of e-ID launched 
worldwide, and that too at a significantly larger scale than in some European 
countries. Specifically, the MyKad is a truly multi-purpose card, containing on the 
64K chip not only the standard personal identification, but also driving licence 
details, passport information, health information and an electronic purse cash 
balance [37]. More recently, the card has been expanded to offer digital certificates 
for signing purposes, as well as a frequent traveller card. Specifically the electronic 
purse illustrates that role that non-government institutions have played in the 
delivery of services. In other countries across Europe private institutions play a role 
in delivering certain infrastructure components, however, the use of the e-ID cards 
are still primarily to perform I-A-S functions for e-Government applications. 
 
Besides the waiving of an application fee, the MyKad has generally been well 
accepted by the population. This can be attributed to the fact that even since 
before Malaysia’s independence in 1965, Malaysians from the age of 12 have had 
to carry a national identity card [37]. There is thus a cultural acceptance to carrying 
a national identity card, which while also the case in some European countries, has 
proven to be a barrier towards acceptance in the United Kingdom. 
 
The primary driver for MyKad has been the “Vision 2020” scheme setup by the 
government to lead Malaysia into a developed country status by the year 2020. In 
order to accelerate achieving these objectives, seven Flagship applications were 
identified [38], one of which was the MyKad, also referred to as the Multipurpose 
Card (MPC). 
 
Unlike many European e-ID cards which evolved from a drive to deliver a token to 
fulfil requirements associated with the European Directive on electronic signatures, 
the key objectives of the MPC were to  
 
“develop a single and common platform for a Multipurpose Card (MPC) that will 
enable the government and private application providers to implement smart 
card solutions without duplications of effort and investment.” [39]  
 
In other words, seeking synergies across government departments and 
streamlining services for citizens was more of an objective than mere compliance 
to a digital signature acts, though a PKI deployment was designed as one of the 
initial applications. Simultaneously, the role of MyKad functioning as a payment 
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card meant that the card delivered value to both private sector banks and citizens 
for usage outside their transactions with government. 
 
Launching a MyKad with EMV (standard from payment card industry) compliant 
banking applications served the following purposes: 
• Encouraged use of the card for more purposes 
• Banks, including foreign owned Citibank, played a financial role in delivery of 
the solution, leading to the MyKad to be a showcase Public-Private-
Partnership (PPP) deployment 
• Encouraged cashless, including electronic wallet, payment transactions 
• Shift from magnetic strip ATM cards to use of more secure chip cards [38] 
In his 2004 paper [37] Mathews Thomas went into considerable depth analysing  
the legal aspects of protecting privacy in a Malaysian context, especially related to 
operation of the MyKad. Thomas concluded that while considerable effort was 
made to secure the card, little was done to protect the privacy of the card holder’s 
data. Most notably, interpretations of the Malaysian constitution would imply 
privacy of card holders should be better protected, however, there was an urgent 
need to clarify and enforce matters through passing additional legislation.  
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6. NATIONAL REGISTRIES & BACK-END DATABASES 
The focus of this project is the e-ID card. However, the role that national registries 
and back-end databases play is very closely coupled to the e-ID card in terms of 
set-up, management functionality provided and how the security and privacy 
aspects are addressed. This chapter will briefly review a few examples of national 
registries and back-end systems to illustrate their set-up, functionality and 
relevance to e-ID cards. 
 
A national registry is often seen as a repository of national identities. The base 
components that a national registry or other database consists of are:  
 
Technology Description 
Databases Generally in the form of Relational Database Management 
Systems (RDBMS), National Registry databases may contain 
biometrics or other unique identifiers 
Networks Provide the communications/connectivity to the databases 
Security Mechanisms to ensure all security aspects of the  database 
system (confidentiality, integrity & availability) are maintained. 
Examples:  access control mechanisms, audit logs, … 
Table 12: Database Key Components 
The different architectural set-up of such systems is out of scope, but in the 
following section we will illustrate, by way of example, a few systems that illustrate 
their diversity in terms of set-up and functionality. 
6.1 National Databases 
Population registries and in general databases of a national – or even international 
significance, can either be designed in a centralised or decentralised manner. 
Benefits and challenges lie in both models. For example a centralised database 
offers more control in terms of securing the data in a single repository. However it 
is more likely to be a target, as it simultaneously operates as a single point of 
failure. A decentralised system can be  considered more privacy friendly, however, 
this is not always the case, and really depends on how the system is setup – in 
other words, a decentralised system with poor access control mechanisms is just 
as likely to be privacy unfriendly as a centralised one is implied to be. 
 
The following countries are examples where agreement has been reached to 
operate a centralised national databases [2]: 
• UK 
• The Netherlands 
• Sweden (storage planned at the police) 
• Italy 
While in Italy and Germany it has been explicitly defined that data related to 
biometrics identity be stored in a decentralised database (with the municipalities), 
France is still in the process of defining their e-ID system, as a result the form of 
database deployed will depend on the system  
• INES (proposed by ministry of interior) – centralised database for all citizens 
• Strategic e-government plan – decentralised storage of biometric data 
6.1.1 The UK National Identity Register (NIR) 
The British National Identity register (NIR) has been defined in the Strategic Action 
Plan for the National Identity Scheme [19]. The NIR is still in the process of being 
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defined and developed. However, early indications of the purpose and set-up have 
been published [19].  Some of the key elements, known so far, about the NIR are 
as follows: 
• Biometrics, such as fingerprints, will be recorded and linked to a single, 
confirmed biographical record 
• A Biographical record is seen as an individual’s name, address, etc and will 
also contain a link to administrative records, such as details related to the 
issued e-ID card associated with the individual, incl. relevant PKI 
certificate details 
• The Identity Cards Act [10] defines which information can be recorded and 
accessed in the NIR  
• Integration of existing biometric database systems, such as for asylum 
seekers 
• Integration of biographical information from the Department of Work & 
Pensions (DWP) Customer Information System (CIS), which contains 
records for all holders of British National Insurance Number 
As with the UK Identity Card scheme as a whole, there is still some public 
opposition to the NIR set-up, use and financial viability. However, it should be 
noted that at present the dialogue is, as of writing, still in progress. Hence no final 
decisions have been made (at least not publicly) regarding the final set-up of NIR 
and how it will address the privacy (including data protection) and financial viability 
concerns of the public.    
6.2 Pan-European Central Databases 
As mentioned above, while some e-ID card schemes are relying on a de-
centralised database system, most rely on some form of centralised national 
identity database. There in fact already exist pan-European identity databases. 
Two examples include: 
• EURODAC 
• Visa Information System (VIS) 
It is interesting to take a look at these database systems, how they have been set-
up, and what measures have been put in place to operate and protect them. In a 
number of areas, national e-ID card database systems face similar issues, such as 
legal compliance, use of biometrics for identification and verification purposes and 
placing protection measures to ensure the database system is not misused. 
 
While both EURODAC and VIS contain centralised identity databases, including 
biometrics, it is also interesting to note that neither systems rely on an identity 
document, per say. EURODAC is simply used to check whether an applicant 
presenting themselves (no document) has presented themselves before. In the 
case of VIS, a Visa may be issued into a passport, usually only represented in the 
form of a sticker pasted onto a passport page. [2] 
6.2.1 EURODAC 
The EURODAC system [40] is a good example of a single-purpose application 
which serves a particular function that often is used to justify an e-ID card system 
with centralised databases.  
 
EURODAC was setup in 2003, based on the European Council Regulation (EC) No 
343/2003 of 18 February 2003, which looked to facilitate to objectives of the Dublin 
II Regulation, to ensure member states take accountability for asylum seekers. 
Simply put, a person can only seek asylum in a single member country. If he or she 
seeks asylum in another country, then EURODAC will identify which country the 
first application was put in at, so that the first country can take accountability for the 
applicant. Or in other words, if no match is found, then one can safely assume that 
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the applicant had not sought refuge in another EURODAC-member country (EU, 
plus a few other countries such as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland).  
 
The system requires all fingerprints from all fingers be captured of any asylum 
seeker over the age of 14. The database does not include any personal details 
about the individual, such as name. It only lets the user of the system know if the 
applicant has already been registered in the database or not.  
 
The set-up of EURODAC has ensured compliance to European Convention of 
Human Rights and UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. There has also been 
no problem associated with violation to any data protection acts.  As an example, a 
data retention period of ten years ensures that after that time the fingerprint records 
are removed from the central system. 
 
The EURODAC Central System is considered to be the “first common Automated 
Identification Fingerprint System (AFIS) within the European Union.” [40] 
6.2.2 European Visa Information System (VIS) 
As with EURODAC, the Visa Information System (VIS) [2] is a centralised database 
driven by multiple EU policies (Dublin accords, Schengen agreement etc.) to 
ensure the free movement of persons, provide a common asylum policy and 
removing of border-checks. 
 
Citizens of 134 countries are required to apply for a visa to enter the European 
Union. Until the creation of VIS, each country could issue and/or deny an applicant. 
This lead to the concept of “visa shopping”, which meant if, for example, a German 
embassy were to deny you a visa, you could go to the French embassy and if 
granted a Visa, could enter into Germany due to a French issued (Schengen) Visa.  
 
In addition to national database systems (referred to as NI-VIS), the VIS also has a 
centralised database, run by the Commission (referred to as CS-VIS).  This 
database contains all applicant data, including biometrics of applicants. In many 
ways, this system is similar to a national registry used for issuing national e-ID 
cards, but for visa applicants.  
 
As with EURODAC, data retention is clearly defined at 5 years, after which the 
records are deleted from the system. By 5 years this means records – 5 years from 
the expiry of the last valid visa issued or when a record was created.  
 
In terms of access control, as VIS serves multiple purposes, including ensuring 
national security – above and beyond prevention of “visa shopping” and ensuring 
visas are issued using a centralised system. As a result, various intelligence and 
security agencies have access to VIS. With this regard, while data of a very 
sensitive nature is stored, the access provided is also to a much larger pool of 
users across all member states. 
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7. KEY COMPONENTS OF E-ID CARDS 
This chapter will introduce the key components that go into the manufacturing of an 
e-ID card: card, chip as well as some other components used to represented the 
identity on the card. Focus will be on the key components representing the e-ID, 
rather than the other features of a more traditional identity card, such as details that 
tend to be printed, laminated or laser-engraved into the card.   
 
The following example below illustrates some of the key components on an e-ID 
card:  
 
 
Figure 9: Some Key Components of an e-ID Card [41] 
7.1 Card Lifecycle 
A card’s lifespan depends on a number of variables 
• Material used 
• Communications type 
• Chip & security mechanism used 
Taking a closer look at these 3 variables: 
 
Variable Impact  
Material used Plastics/PVC – 3-5 years [42] 
Polycarbonate (PC) 
Others, such as paper 
Communications 
type  
Contact – 10 years using PC, though max 5 yrs for 
Plastics/PVC [42] 
Contactless – 5 - 10 years [42] 
Dual-interface – minimum 5 years [42] 
Hybrid – 5 – 10 years, depending on whom you ask. 
More than 4 years hard to prove. [42] 
Chip & security 
mechanism used 
Chips with more memory, storage or custom crypto co-
processors define the lifecycle. 
• Ability to use longer key lengths means content 
signed and/or encrypted can last longer 
• Depending on the form of encryption used, the 
lifecycle is also impacted 
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Table 13: Variables affecting card lifecycle  
7.2 Card Materials 
In general e-ID cards either consist of Polycarbonate or Polyvinly chrolide (PVC). 
There are other materials as well, but these two are the most common. A card 
material is critical to ensure not only extensive wear and tear, but above and 
beyond the physical security features built-in, is the ability to securely embed a 
contact- or contactless smartcard which contains the e-ID. 
 
Cards can consist of different materials [43] [42]: 
 
Material Advantages Disadvantages 
PVC – Polyvinly 
chrolide 
Low material price 
Optimised for use as ID card 
ISO standards have been 
defined for this material 
Recyclable 
Highly inflammable due to 
chlorine content 
Surface wear & tear due to 
scratching, wearing away of 
printing & delamination 
means a lifecycle is limited 
to 3-5 years. 
Limited thermal stability 
PC – 
Polycarbonate 
High Temperature stability 
High mechanical strength 
Recyclable 
High cost of materials 
Low scratch resistance 
High heat consumption 
when laminating, difficult 
handling  
Brittleness can affect 
automatic handling of 
finished cards 
Table 14: Common materials for e-ID cards 
The material and manufacturing process are critical in ensuring that the chip 
remains well integrated into the card. Failure to do so can lead to malfunctioning of 
the card. A protection against a lack of availability is critical to a successful 
implementation. 
7.3 Smartcards 
Though not explicitly mentioned by name, the smartcard chip is a prime example of 
a Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD), as defined in Annex III of the 
European Directive 1999/93/EC on electronic signatures [4]. 
 
A smartcard is in many ways nothing more than a small conventional computer. 
The key components being a central processing unit (CPU), various forms of 
memory, generally ROM, EEEPROM and RAM, in addition to custom hardware 
components, such as cryptographic co-processors. 
 
Moore's law is just as applicable to smartcards as it is to more conventional 
semiconductor products (PCs and servers), leading to estimates that EEPROM 
capacity is able to double every 18 months [44]. That said, the implementation of 
smartcards tends to be driven by volumes and extremely low costs. As a result, 
despite newer technologies causing more powerful processors to be manufactured, 
the pressure on cost has caused a greater popularity (in terms of volumes sold 
over time) with less powerful chips. 
 
In the sections below, we will focus on conventional smartcard hardware 
capabilities as they are being implemented in e-ID cards across Europe (as well as 
for that matter with many ePassport implementations). One should note, however, 
that recently a number of vendors have issued a new breed of smartcards, which 
are capable of increasing memory 1000+ fold and increasing communications 
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interfaces 100 fold. This new breed of smartcards is known as High Density Smart 
Card (HDSC). The use of such high-density smartcards is still being studied [44], 
but one can imagine that with more memory available, new applications and/or 
techniques could be applied to e-IDs. Examples could include other forms of 
biometrics (such as voice or DNA), incorporating an on-card audit trail, supporting 
applications for persons with disabilities (e.g. video clips), as well as storing 
additional personal data, such as higher-resolution images. At present, the cost of 
HDSC cards are at par with conventional flash memory. Given the high volume at 
which e-ID cards are issued, and the pressure to keep costs low, the use of these 
cards still remains only a possibility for the future. However, if these cards are to be 
adopted by mobile phone vendors for next generation SIM cards (USIMs, in 
3G/UMTS networks), we might see a significant drop in prices, leading to a future 
adoption of these cards. For the moment though, such ideas are not being 
circulated widely among the e-ID research community and until standardisation 
bodies adopt HDSC more specifically, we might not, as is the case with 
LaserCard’s Optical storage, see a large-scale commercial adoption of this 
technology for e-ID cards [44]. For this reason, the focus for now will be on 
conventional smartcards only. 
 
The following diagram illustrates a high-level overview of components in a 
smartcard chip: 
 
text
CPU
EEPROMRAM ROM
I/O Co-
Processor
 
Figure 10: Smartcard components (without antenna) [45] [46] 
7.3.1 Central Processing Unit (CPU) 
As with a personal computer, the “brains” of the smartcard is the CPU. Generally 
speaking, the CPU is based on an 8- or 16-bit architecture. More advanced chips, 
such as those based on a 32-bit architecture are also available, though are 
generally not applicable for e-ID implementations due to their higher costs. 
 
Especially for secure e-ID applications that perform cryptographic functions, the 
use of a built-in crypto co-processor is also important. Depending on the supplier, 
the co-processor can handle different key-lengths and standard algorithms such as 
DES, 3DES and AES. 
7.3.2 Memory 
Depending on the vendor and chip packaging process, the distribution of ROM, 
EEPROM and RAM vary, but could be, for example, distributed along the ratios of  
1:4:16 [47]. 
 
ROM – Read Only Memory 
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Generally used to store the operating system and specific applications which are 
not subject to change after that card has been issued. 
 
EEPROM – Electronically Erasable Programmable Memory 
Contents of the EEPROM can be changed at any time, and is therefore more 
flexible. The constraint put on it is generally the size (of available memory) 
In general, smartcards today can support 64-128 EEPROM [44]. 
 
RAM – Random Access Memory 
Challenge: limits the run-time capabilities of the chip, and is often seen as a 
constraint on the performance of applications running on the chip [47]. 
 
FERAM (requires less power, which is important for contactless cards). 
 
7.3.3 Multi Application Card Operating Systems (MACOS)  
The selection of a smart card’s operating system (COS) is a critical design 
decision. Based on which COS is selected, the entire card and application 
management are impacted. As with personal computers, here too there have been 
attempts to control the OS of a smart card. This effort has generally been driven by 
specific smart card suppliers that would gain from a “lock-in” to a specific COS.  
Some vendors, such as Microsoft, launched a COS, Windows for Smart Cards, but 
ultimately withdrew it from the market due to limited acceptance. This too illustrates 
another example of where even when selecting an OS from a major IT vendor can 
cause investments in a “failed” technology to take place. 
 
It is safe to say that today there are two key COS platforms that are relevant to e-
ID cards: MULTOS and JavaCard. Rather than going into detail comparing the two, 
we will focus on their key similarities, which illustrate their popularity as opposed to 
more closed/proprietary card operating systems. 
 
Both MULTOS and JavaCard are known as being a Multi-Application COS 
(MACOS). This means that they are able to support multiple applications on a 
single card. Originally, smartcards were only able to handle single applications or in 
more primitive cases simply support a file system. The MACOS, due to their 
architecture design, not only can handle multiple applications running from a single 
chip, but also ensure that from a security perspective, the applications are clearly 
segregated.  
 
In addition to the security aspects, one of the key features of JavaCard and 
MULTOS is the ability to manage the applications on the card after the cards have 
been issued. This post-issuance management of card applications is critical to 
ensure not only new applications can be loaded to the cards, but also that critical 
security updates can be made, if necessary. 
 
Other key functionality of a COS are as follows [48]: 
 
•  Ability for the card to communicate with the rest of the word using standard 
protocols (usually via a card reader) 
• File and data management within the various parts of the chip (e.g. memory) 
• Managing the access control to various parts of the card to enable CRUD  
(Create, Read, Update & Delete) functionality 
• Managing all security aspects associated with the card and algorithms 
associated with the crypto co-processor 
• Ensuring chip operates as designed and in a stable manner (reliability, 
integrity) 
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• Managing the card throughout its life cycle from chip fabrication, 
personalisation both pre- and post issuance, active use and end-of-
lifecycle. The management of the entire lifecycle is critical, given the 
security aspects that the chip manages (such as those related to private 
keys). 
The above review of Multi-Application Card Operating System similarities generally 
ends at around this stage. When going into the details between JavaCard and 
MULTOS, a clearer divergence regarding implementation approach emerges. It is 
outside the scope of this project to review these. A good comparison, however, is 
illustrated in a report published by the Open Smart Card Infrastructure for Europe 
(OSCIE) v2 report [49]. 
 
At present both MULTOS and JavaCard are considered serious card operating 
systems for e-ID cards. For example the Belgian e-ID card is based on JavaCard, 
while Hong Kong is considered to be one of the first ever e-ID implementations and 
is based on MULTOS. Also, depending on the supplier, different security 
certifications have also been awarded to JavaCard and MULTOS, such as ITSEC 
level 6 (for MULTOS) and Common Criteria level 4 and FIPS 140-2 level 3 (for 
JavaCard). 
 
7.3.4 Card Communication: Contact vs. Contactless 
The UK Identity and Passport Service (IPS) commissioned a survey [42] from 
leading vendors, which included comparing the various forms of cards.  While 
results from respondents varied regarding the time required to develop and 
accredit multi-application software for various cards, based on communication type 
(17% claimed 6 or 12 months for contactless cards, 25% claimed 6 months for 
dual-interface cards), it was clear that two thirds of respondents felt the 
development time was independent of interface type.  
 
According to the survey [42], one vendor stated that issuing of contact cards is 
considered more efficient, as one can more easily personalise cards in parallel. 
Processing a contactless card creates additional electro-magnetic interference, 
making high-volume manufacturing slower. 
 
The time it takes to create, and ultimately issue (or re-issue) a card can have an 
overall impact of the quality of service delivered for e-ID cards.  
 
What is clear, however, is that development of applications clearly depends on the 
type of communication. Changing this attribute once a card has been deployed, 
can cause significant confusion and delays. 
 
7.3.4.1 Contact card communication 
As shown in the above figure of smartcard components, a smartcard generally has 
6 or 8 contacts (also referred to as pins). The exact dimensions and locations of 
contacts are defined by the ISO 7816-2 standard. 
 
Examples for the pin usage include the standard chip features, such as providing 
for power-supply, ground, clock, reset, input/output as well as some more 
application-specific or vendor defined usage.  
 
Using a contact, as opposed to contactless chip, requires that the pins physically 
touch (hence their name, contact card) sensors inside a card reader. This 
procedure can be seen as an additional security enhancement when operating the 
card, as it requires the card holder to “do something” – namely insert the card into 
the reader. While this can be seen as an added activity, hence inconvenience to 
users, it can be seen as a means to prevent unauthorised reading of the card due 
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to the proximity of the holder’s card to an attacker “skimming” the card with a 
contactless reader. 
 
Another weakness of contact cards is their exposure, especially their readers, to 
natural environments. In some harsh environments, particles such as water or dust 
can cause the readers to more easily malfunction. 
7.3.4.2 Contactless card communication 
While the implementation of ePassports is outside of the scope of this project, it is 
worth taking note at the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 
specifications for Machine-readable Travel Documents (MTRDs) with respect to 
contactless technologies are defined. Implementations of contactless cards for 
ePassports is leading to de facto standards to support various e-ID card 
implementations. 
 
ICAO has defined MRTDs to support an operating frequency of 13.56 MHz, which 
lies within the RF Frequency range. This is the same range used by conventional 
RFID tags, and comes under the ISM band, which is generally available for use 
across the world. This frequency is also suitable for efficient power transfer. The 
read/write range is defined to support ranges of up to 10 cm, which is more than 
close-coupling systems (0-1 cm) and certainly significantly less than long-range 
systems capable to of being detected from more than 1 meters distance. [2] 
 
From all forms of smartcard, the contactless card is considered by industry experts 
[42] to have the highest form of physical durability. Nonetheless, how durable a 
contactless card is, depends on the method that the antenna is inlaid into the card, 
as well as the strength of the antenna connection to the chip. Due to the 
manufacturing technique, contactless cards are thus vulnerable to failure, if put 
under physical strain, such as flexing [42]. 
 
Generally, durability of contactless cards is considered higher than contact cards, 
as the physical contact with the reader is eliminated. 
7.3.4.3 Hybrid Cards 
A hybrid card contains 2 chips: A contactless chip and a contact chip. 
 
According to [42], the risk of failure doubles with two chips, as the potential for 
needing two connections between the two chips is required.  
 
Hybrid cards have been deployed in the US as the Common Access Card (CAC), 
which is the de facto standard for US Government issued employee ID cards [42].  
7.3.4.4 Dual-Interface Smartcards 
Unlike the hybrid card that has two chips on a single card, a dual-interface 
smartcard is a single chip that can operate both as a contact- and contactless 
mode. 
 
There are a number of advantages that a dual-interface card brings [42], especially 
in a multi-application context: 
• Use of contactless mode for lower-value applications (more convenience), 
and contact for higher-value applications (added verification) 
• Use contact interface where transaction time is more critical 
• Contact interface can force user to interact for a longer time (as card is 
inserted into reader). This can be useful in certain applications which 
require users to present something (e.g. a PIN or biometric) 
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• As only a single chip exists, the personalisation of cards is more efficient  
Though no examples could be found of national e-ID cards in Europe using dual-
interface technology, it is already widely used as an identity card. For example in 
Japan over 100 million cards have been issued as driving licenses using dual 
interface technology, and in Hong Kong the Octopus public transport card has 
been issued to 8-10 million inhabitants [42].  
 
7.4 Other Card Options 
7.4.1 Magnetic Strips 
The use of magnetic strips to store data on cards has been in use for many years, 
especially in the banking sector. In the case of magnetic strips being standardised 
for use as identity cards, there only seems to be examples of this being done for 
some US drivers licenses that use the standard specified by the American 
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA). ISO specifications 
pertaining to magnetic strips only define their physical properties. [50] 
 
Magnetic strips are prevalent due to their low production and personalisation costs. 
Most cards carry three tracks for storing data elements associated with the card, 
such as name, account number, expiration date and check-sums.  [50] 
 
While in the banking world there has been a transition of using the magnetic strip to 
the smart card, in terms of functionality the two technologies differ significantly – 
most notably in terms of the smart card being able to handle numerous security 
functions, as described above. 
 
Despite their limitations, according to [2] magnetic stripe card technology will co-
exist for “at least another decade”, due to the investment already made into 
existing infrastructure.  
7.4.2 2-D Barcodes 
While the focus on e-ID cards has been on the usage of smartcards, there is in 
addition to the magnetic strip another technology which has recently been both 
standardised and deployed to support secure data storage and identification 
capabilities using an inexpensive technology: the 2-D Barcode. 
 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has worked to define standards for 
ISO standardisation that can support representing a biometric template and other 
personal details on a printable 2D barcode.  These standards are to be applied to 
the ILO seafarers’ identity document. It should be made clear that this document is 
to be issued by nation states as a form of verifying the identity of seafarers. It is not 
supposed to be used as a travel document (passport replacement), for which the 
ILO is seeking to adopt ICAO specifications. [51] 
 
The 2-D barcode technology for the ILO card is defined to store up to 686 bytes of 
data and 64 data symbols to support error correction functionality. This is sufficient 
space to store the biometric templates for two fingers and other details regarding 
the user and issuer which are also printed on the card, such as the issuing 
authority name, unique identifier numbers, expiration dates and the holder’s 
personal details such as name, date of birth, nationality etc. [51] 
 
As the Liberian card implementation has shown [52], additional features can be 
implemented when using the 2-D barcode, such as data compression enabling 
facial images to also be stored on the barcode, as well as the ability to perform 
encryption on the content printed. 
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7.4.3 Optical Storage 
 
Figure 11: Optical Storage Card [53] 
Optical Storage is a technology that despite being defined by ISO/IEC standards 
11693 and 11694 has so far only seen adoption in the Italian Carta d'Identità 
Elettronica (CIE). [54] 
 
In the case of the CIE, it is not seen as a replacement to the smartcard, but rather 
as a complement. Currently models with a chip can store up to 1.1 MB of data 
(without a chip, up to 2.8 MB). This is a significantly higher volume of data than on 
a smartcard (excluding new HDSC cards). [53] 
 
Probably more than for the ability to store high volumes of data, the optical storage 
on the CIE cards are used as a physical attribute on the card, as images can be 
engraved on the card, which are difficult to forge. 
 
While ISO standards for the technology exist, Italy seems to be the only country 
that has deployed the technology. It also seems that the technology is dominated 
by a single vendor, LaserCard. Lastly, the reading of the data requires specific 
card-readers, which are expensive and not widely deployed, hence reducing their 
adoption outside Italy even further. 
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8. CARD SECURITY MECHANISMS 
This chapter will discuss three key mechanisms used to enhance the security of e-
ID cards: 
• Biometrics 
• PKI Integration 
• Physical Protection Mechanisms 
It should be kept in mind that the need to secure the care is multi-dimensional. The 
card in itself is used to perform transactions that need to be conducted in a secure 
manner (e.g. using PKI to sign documents). On the other hand, conducing secure 
electronic transactions can only be performed, if the implementation tools (such as 
the e-ID card) are not put at risk. Hence, we will see here technologies that are put 
in place on e-ID cards hat address both of these dimensions. 
8.1 Biometrics 
8.1.1 Overview 
The ancient Egyptians were not only one of the first to issue identity documents in 
the form of passports, they also were one of the first to use fingerprint biometrics. 
Not exactly for identity documents, but rather by potters to mark their wares [55]. 
 
Taking a look at the use of biometrics in a travel/border control context, one has to 
primarily focus on the considerable activity that is taking place at ICAO. 
Specifically, ICAO is working to standardise the integration of biometrics as 
identifiers into ePassports. As mentioned in the introduction, we will focus on the e-
ID card for non-travel purposes. In most cases, the use of the e-ID for travel 
purposes is simply fulfilled by adopting ICAO MRTD standards into the national e-
ID specifications.  
 
We will for purposes of this study focus, from an e-ID Card perspective, on the 
application of biometrics for the purposes of non-repudiation and identifying an 
individual to digitally sign a document. In order to do this in a European context 
requires compliance to local legislation, which is subsequently compliant with the 
EU Directive on Electronic signatures [4]. 
 
There is another application domain, which is to use a biometric for identifying a 
cardholder when presenting themselves. A scenario where this could be applied is 
when providing an entitlement (e.g. social services). While this use of biometrics is 
often discussed, beyond use of biometrics at the border, there are very limited 
activities to use biometric verification elsewhere. In fact while conducting this study, 
the reference to biometrics in an e-ID context kept appearing. It therefore merited 
further investigation and coverage in as an e-ID card security feature. What has 
become apparent, however, is that with the exception of the UK, whose system is 
still very much “in progress”, there does not seem to be any active use of 
biometrics in European e-ID cards, neither to protect the integrity of the card, nor to 
perform transactions, such as digital signing more securely. There is one 
exception, which is the Italian e-ID card, that is already deployed and is capturing 
both fingerprints and facial images for non-travel purposes. However, although the 
biometric identities are captured and stored within the optical storage component of 
the card, there does not seem to be any documented evidence available describing 
any actual use of this data. 
 
Furthermore, it does not seem, as of present, that any existing legislation exists in 
Europe that clearly defines the use of biometrics for digital signature purposes. As 
a result, the focus of biometrics in an e-ID context is generally replicating the efforts 
 46
of the ePassport domain. In fact the British use of biometrics is being driven by 
compliance to ICAO standards for ePassports which are to be issued by the same 
agency [19]. 
 
There are many forms of biometrics, and the focus here will be on the two most 
commonly ones used for e-IDs and other identity documents, such as ePassports: 
Fingerprints and Facial Images. 
 
Capturing and analysing biometrics can either be performed in an overt or covert 
form [55]. Examples of covert biometrics are video surveillance mechanisms to 
conduct facial recognition, or the use of biometrics in forensic activities. For the 
purposes of e-ID Cards, however, we will focus purely on overt biometrics. 
 
Biometrics can also be viewed as being used to perform either positive or negative 
identification. Positive identification is one where reliance on the given biometric is 
not mandatory. Instead, one can fall back on relying on an alternative form of 
identification. An example of this would be if a smartcard-based biometric 
verification does not work, a manual verification of a facial image printed on the 
card suffices to perform the identification. A negative identification using biometrics 
requires a mandatory biometric operation to be conducted; an example of this 
would be the mandatory use of a biometric to be presented in order to digitally sign 
a document. [55] 
8.1.2 Biometric System Model 
The topic of using biometrics is an entire project subject in itself. We will focus here 
on using the generic Biometric System Model [55] to illustrate five subsystems 
which describe the various functions performed for biometric identification 
purposes. The five sub-systems which we shall take a closer look at are Data 
Collection, Transmission, Signal Processing, Data Storage and Decision. 
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Figure 12: Biometric System Model [55] 
 
Data Collection: 
The data collection of a biometric generally falls into two stages of use: enrolment 
and subsequent presentation stages. During enrolment stage, the biometric is 
captured through the use of a sensor (e.g. a fingerprint reader or camera) for the 
first time or whenever the biometric credential needs to go through the enrolment 
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process. The method of collection should be the same regardless of whether for 
enrolment or future purposes to collect the biometric data. 
 
Transmission: 
The transmission stage is a form of data transfer from the sensor to another 
component where the biometric is further processed – this could be either storage 
on the ID card, such as the smartcard (see data storage phase), another part of the 
card reader or biometric sensor (for signal processing), or a back-end system, 
where any of the remaining stages may take place (storage, signal processing or 
decision making). The biometrics might at the transmission stage be compressed 
using various techniques.  For example, a common technique for fingerprint image 
compression is to use Wavelet Scalar Quantisation (WSQ), while for facial images, 
many standards, such as those defined by ICAO specify JPEG or JPEG-2000 
formats. [2] 
 
Signal Processing: 
A key component of signal processing is the feature extraction procedure. This can 
be seen as a form of non-reversible compression. For example, once fingerprints 
are processed to be represented in a template form, while less data is needed for 
storage (as opposed to a raw image), and also the templates can be compared for 
verification and identification purposes, the ability to obtain the original image is not 
possible.  Another important aspect of the signal processing stage is the quality 
control procedure. A poorly enrolled biometric means that subsequent verification 
against the original becomes difficult. The poor quality may be obtained due to 
poor equipment, enrolment conditions (e.g. dusty sensors), or poorly placed 
biometrics – the inability to adequately enrol is often referred to as the Failure-to-
Enrol-Rate (FTER). For e-ID purposes, the signal processing stage is critical in 
ensuring – or at least being in a position to measure – the quality level, often by 
comparing the ability to compare (or lack thereof) the presented sample with the 
one in the data storage. 
 
Data Storage: 
The storage of biometric data may consist of different forms (depending on how it 
has been processed) as well as being placed in different locations. The placement 
location where biometric data is stored depends a lot on the design of the system, 
which is ultimately driven by the functional requirements that are defined for a 
given solution. For example, for the purposes of conducting a 1:1 verification in a 
privacy-friendly manner, a biometric template can be stored in a secure manner 
together with a verification engine on the smartcard itself, ensuring that the enrolled 
template never leaves the smartcard. This concept is sometimes referred to as 
match-on-card (MOC) functionality – i.e. combining the decision stage (also 
defined in ISO/IEC 24781) in the same physical location as that of the data 
storage. In cases where a primary motivation lies more towards identification as 
opposed to verification, such as with EURODAC and VIS systems (see chapter 6), 
a more centralised data storage system tends to be more prevalent. The larger a 
centralised biometric database, the greater the impact one can expect on speed 
and accuracy (more errors) of the system. Considerable research is still being 
conducted with regards to processing of large-scale biometrics database systems. 
It should also be kept in mind that due to the pre-processing of biometric templates 
in previous stages, the ability to re-construct the original biometric data in the data 
storage stage tends to be difficult. Depending on the design of the system, this can 
have an impact when an e-ID card needs to be re-issued. 
 
Decision Stage: 
At the decision stage, the presented biometric is compared (matched) to the stored 
template. Based on pre-defined policies regarding acceptance thresholds 
associated with multiple variables, such as quality levels, a decision is made as to 
whether to “accept” or “reject” the candidate biometric being presented. The 
techniques applied depend significantly on the algorithms used for matching 
purposes, as well as handling the variables defined in the accept/reject policy.  One 
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must also consider the longevity of the algorithm being applied. This is particularly 
important, as e-ID cards (as well as ePassports) are being defined to carry a 
lifecycle period of up to ten years. [56] 
 
8.1.3 Measuring Biometric Accuracy  
There are many criteria that can be used for measuring the accuracy of a biometric 
technology. Some of the more common ones are listed in the following table. 
 
Measurement  Description 
False Match Rate (FMR) The probability that an identity is incorrectly 
matched.  
False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) The probability that a valid identity is 
incorrectly not matched. 
Failure to Enrol Rate (FTER) The rate at which a biometric identity is 
unable to enrol sufficiently to be used later for 
identification/verification purposes. 
Equal Error Rate (EER) Used to generally describe accuracy levels of 
biometric systems. EER is error rate when 
FMR = FNMR  
Table 15: Biometric Accuracy Measurement Criteria [56] [57] 
It should be noted that the FMR and FNMR are inversely related and so while one  
may wish to reduce both variables, this is impossible. As a result, one needs to find 
a balance between the level of convenience one wishes to provide, versus the risk 
one is willing to take. These decisions depend significantly on the type of 
application being deployed, impacting the overall accuracy of the system, which 
can be seen as another form of trust associated with the technology to do the job 
as designed. The “balanced” rate, if agreed upon, is often referred to as the Equal 
Error Rate (EER).  
 
8.1.4 Fingerprint Biometrics 
The use of fingerprinting to identify individuals has also been a legal form of 
identification for over a century. Yet its use in European e-ID cards is only now 
being seen as a viable or required attribute. It can to some extent be seen as 
viable because of the ability to do something with the fingerprint biometric (e.g. 
perform an identification or verification). Both these types of services require either 
a sophisticated chip (i.e. smartcard) embedded into the card or the availability of an 
IT network infrastructure (to conduct a back-end system check: either identification 
or verification), though alternatives to a smartcard have been illustrated by the use 
of 2-D barcodes. 
 
There are many technologies which can be used to capture fingerprints.  Leading 
technologies, as those selected feasible for the BioFinger project [56] include: 
• Pressure 
• Capacitive 
• Optical 
• Thermal 
There are other sensor technologies, but as was done in [56], for purposes of this 
study we will focus only on those technologies which are well accepted today, and 
for which vendors are supplying products with substantial support and assurance 
levels. 
 
It should be noted that beyond the dilemma of accuracy levels, the number of open 
issues with regards to use of biometrics from a remote, unattended, location are 
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greater than would be desired. While various innovations exist, to ensure liveness 
(i.e. fake or dead fingers are not used), the main prevention for the use of 
fingerprint biometrics in e-ID cards is their lack of industry standards.  
8.1.5 Facial Biometrics 
The earliest forms of identity documents naturally did not have a photograph. In 
fact it took abound a hundred years after the modern form of photography had 
existed, until photographs started appearing in identity documents [14]. In 1914, 
Charles Inglis (an alias for a German spy carrying a fake US passport) had a 
passport consisting of a single sheet, valid for two years and bearing no 
photograph. Five weeks after the execution of the apparent Inglis, on December 21 
1914, the US Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan required photographs to 
be issued with passports. [14] 
 
One of the key reasons why it took over a century for photographs to be used 
together with identity documents has initially to do with the cost to develop 
photographs (both equipment and material) but also due to the complexity with 
which to take the photographs. The first form of portrait photography in 1839 
required the subject to remain motionless for half an hour facing sunlight! [14] This 
challenge with cost (time and money) associated with using a secure form of 
biometrics is once again being discovered with DNA, which is being ruled out for 
secure identification due to the complexity, not its accuracy. 
 
The first use of colour photographs for passports appeared in the US passport in 
February 1958 [14]. The first use of digital images for passports appeared in the 
Japanese passport in November 1992 [14]. While digitisation of facial images can 
be seen as an improvement, Lloyd expresses his doubts, when stating that 
pixilation “reduces definition and accuracy” [14]. In fact, Lloyd illustrates an 
example of a Czechoslovakian passport photograph taken in a 1931 studio as an 
example of image quality that would put “present-day photographs to shame” [14].  
 
It should be noted that even the use of facial biometrics today is primarily focussed 
on image presentation rather than conducting a sophisticated matching or 
verification procedure.  Thus the use of the facial biometric is considerably different 
for an application use than a fingerprint.  
 
As an example, today’s use of facial biometric in the Belgian e-ID card only store 
the image electronically, and then digitally signs it for integrity purposes [16]. There 
does not seem to exist any e-ID system in Europe today that uses (or has near 
plans) to use facial biometrics for electronic matching via verification or 
identification techniques, as described. This, despite significant research on facial 
matching research being conducted in the context of secure identity documents. 
 
8.1.6 Hybrid – Multimode Biometrics 
While accuracy levels with the use of single forms of biometrics are limited by the 
technology available today, studies have proven [58] that combining multiple forms 
of biometrics, for example facial and fingerprint recognition, increases the overall 
accuracy of the ability to verify an identity. Use of multimode biometrics may be 
one of the answers to overcome limitations of single-use biometrics today. 
8.1.7 Other forms of Biometrics 
In addition to fingerprint and facial images, there is considerable research, as well 
as many commercial vendors, that illustrate other forms of biometric that can be 
used to uniquely identify individuals. As these forms of biometric are presently not 
seeing their way into present e-ID standards, we will only mention them here to 
illustrate the breadth of the field, as well as the lack of a single dominant biometric 
standard for e-ID cards moving forward.  
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• Iris Scan 
• Dynamic Signature 
• Retina 
• DNA 
• Speaker identification / voice verification 
• Hand geometry 
8.2 PKI Integration 
The Directive on Electronic Signatures (Article 3.2) states [4] that an advanced 
electronic signature is defined as: 
 
“an electronic signature which meets the following requirements:  
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;  
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;  
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control; 
and  
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent 
change of the data is detectable.”  
 
According to Myhr [9], today only PKI-based technology is able to fulfil these 
requirements. Therefore, for those e-ID cards which wish to support being used to 
implement (advanced) electronic signatures, the use of PKI is critical. 
8.2.1 PKI Interoperability 
As mentioned, the use of PKI is fundamental to e-ID deployments.  However, as 
pointed out in [2], there exists no pan-European Root-CA. This leads to a key 
challenge facing e-IDs today, namely a lack of interoperability.  
 
The use of a pan-European PKI is beyond the scope of this project. It is however a 
key inhibitor related to enabling interoperability across national e-ID cards. The use 
of PKI is also a subject in e-ID cards, where the use of the technology is deployed 
in order to protect and trust the contents from being viewed or tampered. Once 
again, in parallel, ICAO is studying aspects of PKI, but purely from the perspective 
of supporting an ePassport. 
 
A general agreement in the research community seems to be that the use of 
federated identity management (FIM) is the key to addressing interoperability. The 
use of federation, however is only now been addressed in an e-ID context, 
primarily following an initial EU-funded project called GUIDE, which attempted to 
use of federated network identity management to address the interoperability 
challenges from a technical perspective, specifically in an e-ID card context. 
8.2.2 Functions of PKI for e-ID Cards 
The use of a PKI to support basic e-ID card functionality is critical. In general, there 
are five areas where PKI plays an important role: 
 
• Proving integrity/authenticity of card  
• Proving integrity/authenticity of data stored on card 
• Authentication of the card holder or other contents on the card 
• Digitally and electronically signing electronic documents 
• Encryption using key material stored on the card 
 51
Naturally the above are not the only usage areas of PKI in an e-ID card context. 
For example, a lot of the critical infrastructure that supports the deployment of e-ID 
cards (readers, back-end databases) will also leverage PKI to ensure integrity, 
secure communication links and protect access to critical data. These application 
domains however are out of scope for this project. 
8.3 Physical Protection Mechanisms 
The following section will briefly illustrate various forms of physical security 
mechanisms that have been incorporated into e-ID cards. These protection 
mechanisms provide benefits associated with preventing forgeries – either clones 
or tampering with genuine cards. The objective of these technologies is in many 
cases to at least making it more difficult and expensive to reproduce the technique 
applied.  
 
Some of the mechanisms can be verified using visual or tactile checks. Others 
require special equipment to verify authenticity. All technologies, with the exception 
of DNA gene coding, are already being used today on e-ID cards across Europe. 
There is a natural trade-off with these protection mechanisms, namely their high 
costs, which while increasing the barrier for forgers, likewise governments are put 
under pressure to produce a card that is inexpensive to procure. 
 
Mechanism Description and Benefits 
Laser engraving Use of laser engraving as opposed to other 
forms of printing causes permanent changes to 
the card (generally polycarbonate).  Can be used 
to create tactile dots or engraved dots (leaving 
surface untouched). Requires expensive 
equipment to generate engraving. Engraving can 
take place at same time as chip personalisation.  
Holograms No standards exist for holograms, enabling 
customised holograms to be produced for optical 
checks of 3D image visible to naked eye. 
Multiple Laser Images (MLI) Functions similar to a laser image with regards to 
multiple images being displayed for visual 
checks. Unlike holograms, however, laser 
engraving techniques are used to create the 
images. As a result, they are more deeply 
integrated into the card, thus making it harder to 
forge. 
UV Colours Special inks which change the way they look 
when put under a ultra-violet (UV) light. 
Micro-printing Printing technique used on the card with a font 
size so small that it nearly impossible to read with 
the naked eye. As a result, making a photocopy 
or use of more conventional printing (forging 
scenario) makes it difficult to reproduce.  
Thermal transfer printing Works similar to a heated needle for printing 
purposes. Allows high resolution images such as 
logos and photos to be printed on the card for 
visual checks. 
Thermal sublimination 
printing  
A process of heat-sensitive inks transferred to a 
permanent dye-substrate with polymer-coated 
surfaces. Due to the sublimination process, 
images printed on card are highly scratch-
resistant.   
Optical Variable Ink (OVI) Special inks that change colour/appearance 
when changing the viewing angle. These inks are 
proprietary and difficult/expensive to procure. 
Nano Code Using nano-sized dye films of different colours 
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Mechanism Description and Benefits 
are layered and ground creating a special 
powder. The pigments of this powder can be 
analysed using a special technique verifying the 
authenticity of printing. 
Gene Code Use of hereditary DNA dissolved in solutions and 
imprinted for authentication purposes. Still under 
research. 
Table 16: Physical Protection Mechanisms [43] 
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9. RISK ASSESMENT  
The focus of this chapter is to take a critical look at the risks associated with the 
present-day and future e-ID card implementations. It should not be seen as a 
formal risk assessment of e-ID cards, but rather a risk assessment of the topics 
covered in this project, which have  been scoped out in Chapter 2. 
 
As a guideline, the principles of The British Standard Information Security 
Management Systems – Part 3: Guidelines for Information Security Risk 
Management, BS 7799-3:2006 [59], have been used. Using this model of 
conducting risk assessment, the topics addressed include reviewing relevant 
assets, sources of requirements, identification of significant threats and 
vulnerabilities, as well as their valuations, and last but not least, an identification of 
any relevant controls or countermeasures that could be put in place.  
 
9.1 Sources of Requirements (Legal & Business)  
As discussed in the introductory chapters, the drivers for e-ID cards differ from 
country to country, however there is a general theme within Europe for government 
to put the necessary frameworks and infrastructure in place to enable electronic 
signatures to be used, for e-Government services to be more widely adopted. 
These are all initiatives that can be seen as organisational or business objectives 
that drive the launching of e-ID cards. In addition to these drivers, which exist both 
at a European and national level, there are supporting legal and regulatory 
requirements. These are covered in the following table, with specific detail to the 
legal landscape in the next chapter. 
 
Drivers Legislation 
National Security Often the e-ID cards are issued by government 
departments closely related to protection of national 
security, such as Ministry of Interior. The assets that 
come under their domain, such as national database 
registries that contain e-ID data, are considered critical 
national infrastructure. Each country has measures, 
such as dedicated agencies in place to protect this 
infrastructure.  
e-Government  European Electronic Signatures Directive and national 
legislation enforcing directive 
European Data Protection Directive and national 
legislations enforcing directive 
European Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications and national legislations enforcing 
directive 
Identity Theft / Data 
Protection 
National ID Card Legislations 
European Data Protection Directive 
Table 17: e-ID Card Drivers 
9.2 Assets Requiring Protection 
In a formal BS7799 evaluation, the first stage to conduct is a comprehensive 
review of existing assets. This review is just as relevant to an e-ID card system as 
any more conventional system. However, the scope of this project is focussed on 
the e-ID card, and hence many additional relevant assets will not be reviewed 
within this assessment. 
 54
Asset Type Asset Description 
Identity 
Information  
(in chip) 
Identity Attributes  Data, stored electronically on the chip 
that by itself, or in combination, 
uniquely identifies the identity. 
Examples: Name, Date of Birth, 
National Registry number, Address, 
but also non-text information such as 
biometric identifiers 
 Cryptographic/PKI 
relevant material 
Non-identity attributes that are 
relevant to ensuring the security 
(integrity, secrecy) of the contents on 
the card are handled as intended. 
Examples include public and private 
keys, certificates and digital 
signatures, key generation material. 
Software (in chip) Card Operating 
System (COS) 
Smartcard operating system, such as 
JavaCard or MULTOS. Includes card-
management and certain crypto-
applications. 
 Cryptographic / 
Key management 
applications 
Applications associated with 
managing the keys. These include 
access to key though PIN entry, 
generation of keys, use of keys etc. 
 Core e-ID card 
applications 
Applications loaded onto smartcard to 
perform standard e-ID card 
applications such as identification, 
verification, digital signing, 
authentication 
 Other applications Other applications that are added 
onto the card that are beyond the 
standard I-A-S types.  
May be government issued/related, 
such as for supporting e-Health, 
MRTD/ICAO specifications or driver 
licenses. 
Or may be applications from private 
sector, such as use by banks for 
authentication or payment purposes. 
Physical Assets 
(on card) 
Plastic / 
Polycarbonate 
card 
Physical card on which e-ID is 
represented, embeds chip and 
antenna (if contactless). May contain 
physical protection mechanisms, such 
as holograms. 
 Smartcard Chip Smartcard chip (silicon) that manages 
and contains e-ID. May also have an 
antenna for contactless access. 
 Other forms of 
storage 
Optical storage, 2-D barcodes, 
magnetic stripes… 
People Private citizens 
(cardholder) 
The primary holder, user of the e-ID 
card. The e-ID card is generally 
issued in their name. 
Organisational 
Assets 
Reputation / 
Image 
Reputation / image of issuing agency 
or other organisations/institutions 
associated with the image of the e-ID 
card. 
 Trust (in national 
infrastructure / 
government) 
The trust put in by the citizens who 
use the card, as well as other 
institutions using the e-ID card to 
perform I-A-S applications with the 
card. 
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Table 18: Relevant Assets for e-ID cards 
Other relevant assets, such as card readers, back-end systems, PKI, other persons 
involved in the enrolment and production process are critical, but will remain 
outside the scope of this evaluation. Their significance, however, should not be 
underestimated. 
 
9.3 Valuation of Assets 
When assessing the above assets, it is important to understand their value. When 
an asset is somehow compromised, then only if their value is deemed high enough, 
that one can put the necessary controls in place at a level pertinent to their value. 
 
Asset Valuation Scale 
Scale Level Impact 
High Impact is so great that trust in using e-ID card is lost.  
Impact of damaged caused by a compromised system leads 
to significant risk exposure. 
Medium Compromising/losing the asset will cause an inconvenience 
but not disrupt the entire e-ID system. Will require some or 
significant administrative effort to address any disruption 
caused. 
Low Compromising/losing the asset will cause minor 
inconvenience. 
Table 19: Asset Valuation Scale 
In our scenario, the physical assets can in general be replaced if damaged or 
otherwise compromised. Hence, the on-card assets are in general of medium 
value. If, however, vulnerabilities in these assets are found to impact an entire 
population, then the value of the impact is significantly greater. We will not conduct 
a formal valuation at this stage, but rather present in the table above the types of 
valuation levels that need to be considered when conducting a more formal 
assessment.  
 
Probably the most critical value, more than the identity attributes, are the 
cryptographic applications and their relevant material. Should these be 
compromised, on an individual or mass-scale level, then probably not only damage 
is done to the true identity (person), but also if made public, to a general trust, and 
hence reputation of the entire system. An example where this caused some issues 
was in Singapore where authorities did not trust the system sufficiently enough to 
accept it as a valid replacement for a passport [60]. On the other hand, it was a 
matter of overall trust, which is a human assessment, since Brunei assumed the 
card sufficiently trustworthy to accept it. 
 
9.4 Threats, Vulnerabilities & Controls 
In this section, we will review the most relevant threats, vulnerabilities and 
applicable controls pertaining to the e-ID cards, as covered in this report. 
9.4.1 Masquerading / False Accepts 
An e-ID card may be falsely accepted. Either due to intentional or unintentional 
reasons. 
 
Unintentional False Accept 
Errors in technology, for example those inherent in biometrics, may cause incorrect 
identities to be falsely accepted. 
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A common countermeasure is to use an appropriate mix of identification 
techniques and technologies to increase accuracy. For example, combine two 
forms of biometrics to increase the precision levels. 
 
Intentional through accessing key material 
Various attack mechanisms exist (e.g. side-channel attacks) that can be used to 
divulge the key material for accessing the content.  These tend to be physical 
attacks to the smartcard. Some common techniques used include:  
• Power Analysis Attack [61] [62] 
• Fault Analysis [63] [61] 
• Timing Analysis [61] [64] 
• Differential Power Analysis [61] 
• Differential Fault Analysis [61] 
• Optical Fault Induction Attack [65] 
The above are methods also known as side-channel analysis, which enables, 
through an observation of communications on the chip to divulge the transactions, 
eventually leading to identification of relevant key material. These techniques of 
hardware (chip) attack are continuously being improved, while vendors likewise 
incorporate more sophisticated control measures to prevent various forms of 
attack.  
 
This content (such as private keys) that are obtained from such attacks as the 
above mentioned, can be used to modify or create "clone" cards. The dangers that 
arise with e-ID that was less of an issue with non-electronic identities, is the ability 
to perform an e-ID transaction in a remote location where a malicious attack with 
the ID card is done without the supervision of a public official. 
 
Intentional through skimming 
In some cases, authentication is done in the form of a PIN entry. A common 
method of attack is to “skim” the PIN (i.e. overlook the genuine holder while they 
enter the PIN) after which someone steals the genuine card. While revocation 
mechanisms can be put in place to prevent a card reported lost or stolen, should a 
victim be unable (or unaware) of their card being vulnerable, can lead to such an 
attack being successful. Use of biometrics is an alternative form of countermeasure 
– assuming this is harder to skim. 
 
Breaking and failing PKI 
e-ID cards as they are designed today are dependent in more ways than one on 
the use of PKI technology.  
 
PKI risks have been extensively documented [66] [2], to be vulnerable to attack, 
especially related to inability to protect private keys. Likewise, cryptographic 
lifetime of keys are also a limitation that can affect optimum use and trust of a 
system. Examples include electronically signed documents whose certificates have 
expired or encrypted documents that are due to lost keys unable to be retrieved 
(can also be seen as a form of denial of service, see next section). 
9.4.2 Denial of Service / False Rejects / Lack of Acceptance & 
Availability 
One of the three pillars of information security is availability. Lack of availability 
(e.g. of the e-ID card or material on it) can lead to a denial of service. 
 
Acceptance of e-ID cards is also dependent on usability. There are multiple 
features of using an e-ID card which may be unfamiliar to the average user/citizen. 
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While the use of a magnetic stripe for swiping, as is the use of a PIN, are both 
considered conventional uses of bank/payment cards, their use in other application 
areas is less common. Especially when the chip is used to perform a function 
beyond simple authentication of user via PIN. The idea that the e-ID can be used 
to sign a document causes considerable confusion, if nothing else because the 
concept of electronic and digital signatures are not exactly the same as a human 
signature, let alone the perception of what an electronic/digital signature is to an 
average citizen. 
 
Another usability challenge is being faced today by deployment of readers. 
According to [67] early deployments of smartcards in Europe faced challenges with 
the readers, so much so that in some cases around 50% of users required calling a 
hotline to get support with installing the necessary readers.  
 
Intentional lack of availability 
There is very little that can be done if a user intentionally wishes to deny access to 
a service. The card holder can easily dispose of a card and claim it was lost. More 
difficult is intentional tampering with the card to make it unusable. This is of course 
possible (nail polish on the chip can easily destroy the card from subsequent use), 
but countermeasures do exist, such as making the card contactless or use of 
stronger materials such as polycarbonate with more tamper-resistant laser-
engraving. In general though, if someone doesn’t want their card to be useable, 
there is very little to prevent them from doing so. 
 
Intentional denial of service can also be initiated by impacting the systems that use 
the e-ID cards. Protection measures for such scenarios lies outside the scope of 
this project. 
 
Inability to be Interoperable 
Lack of interoperability, means “lack of market acceptance and market proliferation 
of electronic signatures” [68] referencing [5] 
 
At present, most e-ID card solutions in Europe are being created as stand-alone or 
island solutions. Some attempts have been made in Austria to accept foreign-
issued cards. However, such attempts are at a very early stage. There exists a 
general risk that adoption of e-ID cards for their intended purposes will be limited 
unless their acceptance across national borders can work, as is the case today 
with mobile phones and payment cards, not to speak of passports as a form if 
identification. As people in Europe are more likely to work or live in countries other 
than those of their citizenship (examples, Poles working in UK, Englanders retiring 
in Spain), this will be a more necessary requirement to fulfil. 
 
There is no true “countermeasure” to address the above problem, other than put 
policies and standards in place that leads to e-ID cards being issued that are 
interoperable. 
9.4.3  Human Error  
As in many IT systems, e-ID cards are also prone to what can often be referred to 
as the weakest link: the human being. 
 
Human error can take place at any stage where he/she is involved. For example, 
during the enrolment processing, data may be incorrectly entered leading to 
confusion once the identity card has been issued. This is especially true with seed 
documents whose validity is less questioned. Likewise, during enrolment, 
biometrics can be captured poorly leading to a higher level of false rejects.  
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10. STANDARDS & LEGISLATION 
At present, interoperability across various national e-ID card systems is limited. 
This constraint could be alleviated if Europe decided on a common e-ID 
infrastructure, or at least common standards. While this is being attempted through 
various mechanisms, such as the Porvoo Group and the European Citizen Card 
(ECC) set of standards within European Standardisation body, CEN, the real 
restrictions lie with the legislative hurdles, most notably Art. 18 (3) of the European 
Commission Treaty, which will be discussed in more detail in this chapter. 
10.1 Interoperability 
One of the key drivers to define and adopt standards is to ensure interoperability 
across various implementations. While to the layman the term interoperability might 
seem quite obvious, taking a closer look at the theory behind the term illustrates 
some complexity behind the word. 
 
The Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS) Study on ID Documents [2] 
illustrated a modified Technical, Formal, Informal (TFI) model, influenced by 
Okusel’s Open Systems Framework of Social Interaction [69], to show how 
supporting interoperability for e-IDs can be viewed from three different layers: 
Technological, Formal (Legal) and Informal (Socio-cultural). 
 
 
Figure 13: Modified TFI model, influenced by the Open Systems Framework 
of Social Interaction [2] 
For purpose of this study, we will focus on the bottom two layers: Technological 
and Formal (Legal) drivers.  
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10.2 Technological Standards 
10.2.1 International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) / 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IES) 
 
The International Organisation for Standardisation / International Electrotechnical 
Commission (ISO/IEC) is one of the key institutions responsible for standardisation 
at an international level.  
 
ISO and IEC have formed a joint technical committee focussed on Information 
Technology (JTC1). Within the “JTC” there is a subcommittee, SC17, that is 
focussed on standardisation of personal identification and cards. Many of the 
relevant standards that are applicable for European e-ID cards fall under the 
domain of SC17. 
 
ISO Standard Objective 
ISO 7816 With 15 sub-sections, the ISO 7816 standards 
define many characteristics associated with 
electronic Identity cards, especially pertaining 
to aspects related to smartcards. Includes 
both definitions of physical attributes, as well 
as specific software related commands for 
card security and management. 
ISO 7811 Defines the recording techniques for 
identification cards, primarily focused on 
those with magnetic strips [43]. 
ISO 7810 Defines 3 standard formats for Identity cards: 
ID-1, ID-2, and ID-3, each with different sizes. 
The ID-1 is the most common standard, which 
is often used for credit cards and all newly 
issued e-ID cards, as well as next generation 
drivers’ licenses. The current (legacy) 
German Identity Card is defined by the 
slightly larger ID-2 specification. 
ISO 24781  Consists of two parts. The first part defines a 
framework for the use of smartcards for 
applications where biometric matching takes 
place on the card itself, i.e. “Match-on-Card” 
(MOC). The second part defines process 
requirements related to interoperability. 
ISO 19794 Biometric Data Interchange Format. Comes in 
7 parts and includes among others, 
fingerprints, facial and iris biometrics. 
ISO 14443 Defines the standards for “proximity” identity 
cards, also referred to as contactless cards. 
The standard comes in four parts, defining 
different communication protocols and coding 
schemes. 
Table 20: ISO/IEC Standards 
10.2.2 European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) 
The CEN is the standardisation body at a European level. The CEN 224 committee 
is focussed on identification cards. Within CEN 224 there are a number of working 
groups (WG) that focus on various applications related to identification cards. Since 
2003, WG 15 has been established to define standards for the European Citizen 
Card (ECC). 
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CEN Standard Objective 
CEN/TS 15480 European Citizen Card Standard split into 3 
parts:  
Part 1: Physical, Electrical and Transport 
Protocol 
Part 2: Logical Data Structure and Security 
Services 
Part 3: Management of the card and services 
Part 4: Recommendations for ECC issuance, 
operation and use 
Table 21: CEN ECC Standards 
While within the e-ID card community across Europe there is frequent reference to 
the ECC standards and activities being performed by CEN to come up with a pan-
European standard for e-ID cards, there is practically no publicly available 
documentation describing these standards, let alone any publication of the 
standards for public review.  From what could be discovered through informal 
conversations only, is that the standards for the ECC are primarily being written by 
the card industry (vendors), who have a vested commercial interest in having a 
common card. This makes sense if one observes the success of standards in the 
payments (EMV) and communications (GSM SIM) sectors. 
 
However, given that the ECC is a standard that would require adoption by national 
institutions, a lack of their active participation, and in some cases implementation of 
non-ECC standards (e.g. Belgium, Austria, Estonia, Finland, UK to name a few), 
illustrates that this standard is from the onset being developed primarily from a 
vendor’s perspective and not from a “users” perspective. In this case the “user” 
being national governments that would issue the card. 
10.2.3 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a United Nations (UN) body 
which defines numerous standards in the travel industry. For the purpose of this 
study, the most important ICAO specifications to pay attention to includes the one 
related to Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs), often known as 
Document (Doc) 9303.  
 
First published in 1980 as "A Passport with Machine Readable Capability", Doc 
9303 is now published in three separate Parts. 
 
ICAO Document 9393 Purpose 
Part 1 - Machine Readable 
Passports 
Initial specifications related to the Machine 
readable Passport (MRP), including the 
machine readable zone (MRZ), which is 
optical character recognition (OCR) readable 
text. A subset of standard is sometimes 
followed on e-ID cards that have an MRZ (see 
for example Figure 9). A second volume to 
Part 1 specifies the enhancements to MRP to 
include biometric identifiers, thus defining 
requirements for an “ePassport”. 
Part 2 - Machine Readable 
Visas 
 
Defines standard format for machine-readable 
visas inserted into passports (similar to part 1 
in terms of technology). 
Part 3 - Size-1 and Size-2 
Machine Readable Official 
Travel Documents 
 
Specifies MRTDs to have dimensions 
including ISO 7810’s ID-1 format. In 2007 a 
specification including adoption of ISO 14443 
standards (i.e. use of contactless smartcards) 
will be published. 
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Table 22: Three parts to ICAO Doc 9303 [18] 
e-ID card implementations across Europe are adopting various aspects of Doc 
9303 to enable e-ID cards be used as an MRTD or as a passport replacement for 
certain countries (e.g. within Europe and North Africa). However, there is some 
“scope creep” with regards to use of the biometrics and authentication mechanisms 
for non-travel purposes. This poses a potential challenge as the requirements in 
ICAO were designed to serve a specific travel-related function, and poorly 
addresses use in non-travel scenarios. For example, the method of suspending or 
revoking an ePassport is very different from how it would be handled at a national 
level. Also, there are some legal challenges within Europe regarding the use of 
ICAO specification outside their adoption for ePassports.  
10.2.4 Other Technological Standards 
The above technological standards are only a glimpse into the most relevant ones 
today defining e-ID cards as a whole. There are of course far too many other 
standards that are relevant to e-ID card success. Some of them are already well 
established and used, such as RSA’s Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), 
most notably PKCS #11 and PKCS #15, which are specific to cryptographic tokens 
(i.e. smartcards). 
 
Another example of an existing standard, which is finding wide use in e-ID cards, is 
the X.509v3 standard defining the structure of digital certificates. This standard was 
defined by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). As this study has 
shown, X.509v3 certificates are, for example, used in both Belgian and Estonian e-
IDs.  
 
The above examples are only illustrative of other relevant standards. There are far 
too many to mention for this study, such as those defined by IEEE and Sun. 
 
In addition to more established standards, many have yet to reach a level of 
maturity, such as ECC. Examples where standards are still in a more “emerging” 
stage include those related to interoperability and biometrics. 
10.3 Formal (Legal) Standards 
It should be noted that there is no European-wide legislation mandating or defining 
a National identity card, let alone an electronic one. The European Constitution, if it 
had been passed, would have set the path towards a European ID card. The 
ratification of a European Constitution, however, was stalled in 2004. 
 
As the focus of this project is on European e-ID card schemes, we will emphasise 
the role that European legislation (i.e. mandated by the European Commission) 
has had on e-ID cards. We will conclude this chapter by also reviewing legislation 
at a national level, which at the end of the day defines the finer implementation 
details. 
10.3.1 European Directive on Electronic Signatures – 1999/93/EC 
This directive is critical in determining the future of e-ID cards. It is the principle 
directive behind legitimising (advanced) electronic signatures. The directive 
actually is primarily focussed on ensuring that electronic signatures carry the same 
legitimacy as hand-written signatures as opposed to defining the electronic 
signature’s legal status and/or use. 
 
Thomas Myhr’s preliminary 2005 study on the regulatory framework supporting a 
pan-European e-ID [9] took a critical look at the directive, with an attempt to better 
understand whether the directive was purely focussed on digital signing or also 
addressing entity authentication. This is a fine, but critical point, which Myhr 
illustrated is in many cases subject to interpretation. Myhr concluded that while 
entity authentication can be said to be covered by the directive, it lacks many 
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critical aspects, and at best can be considered insufficient, mainly due to the fact 
that the directive does not explicitly distinguish, let alone address the differences 
between electronic signatures and entity authentication. That said, should it be 
assumed that entity authentication be covered by the directive, then one has to 
pose the question as to what mechanism can be used to represent an entity, which 
would need to be authenticated. This is where Myhr considers the e-ID (or 
equivalent) as something which is mandated by the directive. Even more so, given 
the universality of a directive to be supported by all member states, Myhr 
emphasises the need for the e-ID to be legitimate across all of Europe (i.e. function 
as a pan-European e-ID).  Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether the directive 
does indeed cover entity and/or data authentication, in which case more legislation 
might be required. It is for this reason that Myhr goes on to illustrate the 
requirements necessary to draft a directive specific to defining authentication.  
 
Before moving on to the importance of the Data Protection Directive, it is 
interesting to note Myhr’s observation [9] that it is not only the Data Protection 
Directive, but also the Electronic Signature Directive itself which addresses privacy 
of e-IDs. Specifically, Article 8 makes it clear [4] that not only those providers of 
certificate issuance, but also the Certification Service Provider (CSP) is limited on 
“how he can collect data concerning the holder/signatory.” 
 
The directive [4] also defines in Annex III the key functions of a secure signature-
creation device (SSCD), which is the technology that ensures an electronic 
signature can be generated.  As has been mentioned in other parts of this study, in 
today’s technology the SSCD is generally seen as being represented by a 
smartcard – at least for portable signing purposes. Naturally in a more static, e.g. 
server-side transaction, a signing device may also come in the form of a Hardware 
Security Module, often known simply as an HSM.  
 
10.3.2 Data Protection and Privacy 
In addition to the above legislation related to signatures, probably the second most 
referred European legislation of relevance to e-ID cards, is said to be the following 
two directives: 
• European Data Protection Directive 95/46 
• European Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 
2002/58/EC 
As e-ID cards deal with individual citizens handling their own identity, the nature of 
each transaction they perform deals with sharing their identity credentials with third 
parties, be these governments or private organisations. Regardless of whom they 
share their credentials with, the very fact that a personally identifiable information 
(PII) is shared with a third party, requires this third party to comply with data 
protection and privacy legislation. Specifically, it requires that the information being 
processed is used only for it’s intended purpose. 
 
In addition to the e-ID credential stored on the card, as we saw in Chapter 6, the 
role of national registries and back-end database systems which are also subject to 
privacy and data protection legislation. These large, potentially massively complex 
and centralised systems have also caused considerable popular concern, but as 
we saw in Chapter 6, there have been promising signs, for example with 
EURODAC and VIS systems, that European legislation can be enforced to an 
agreeable manner. 
 
10.3.3 European Commission Treaty Article 18 
The EC Treaty Article 18 is probably the most important document pertaining to the 
inability to have a pan-European e-ID card which would solve many issued related 
to interoperability.  
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Specifically, Article 18 states the following: 
 
“1. Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside  
freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations  
and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures adopted to give  
it effect.  
 
2. If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain this  
objective and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council  
may adopt provisions with a view to facilitating the exercise of the rights  
referred to in paragraph 1. The Council shall act in accordance with the  
procedure referred to in Article 251.  
 
3. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to provisions on passports, identity cards,  
residence permits or any other such document or to provisions on social  
security or social protection.” [9] 
 
The comments in paragraph 3 are the most critical. It suggests that identity cards 
can not be mandated at a pan-European level, even if they could fulfil other basic 
rights of Europeans, such as free movement (paragraph 1).  
 
Despite Article 18 (3) of the EC Treaty, initiatives such as the Hague Programme in 
2004 introduced the idea of defining common standards for identity cards amongst 
member states [2]. The ECC standard is an example where such attempts have 
been made, but not with any true political or legislative backing. 
 
Likewise, one should not forget that, despite being turned down, had the European 
Constitution passed, we would have seen a reversal in policy, and set the stage for 
mandating a pan-European ID Card. 
10.3.3.1 Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 defines the 
“standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents 
issued by Member States.” 
 
This regulation ensures European states offer interoperability of biometric 
technologies/implementations for passports and travel documents. As many e-ID 
cards are being defined to also act as travel documents, this regulation carries 
significant weight. [2] 
 
It is of particular interest to note the reference in paragraph (3) of this regulation to 
ICAO’s 9303 documentation. This reference has caused some contention as a 
report of the Parliament on the Commission proposal for a Council regulation on 
standards for security features and biometrics in EU citizens’ passports concluded 
that “Document No 9303 should not be referred to in an EU regulation, since it is 
constantly being amended by a means which lacks transparency and democratic 
legitimacy” [2] 
10.3.4 Other European Legislation 
As with technological standards, likewise with European Legislation there is much 
more legal material that one can review. A few other pertinent legislation, as 
covered by Myhr [9], is referenced in the following table. 
 
European Legislation Purpose 
Directive 2000/31/EC … on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive 
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European Legislation Purpose 
on electronic commerce') 
Directive 2001/97/EC … on prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering. 
Myhr points out [9] that this directive is a good 
example illustrating the need for an identity 
document that enables fulfilment of an 
European directive.  The Money Laundry 
directive states: “... institutions shall require 
identification of their customers by means of 
supporting evidence when entering into 
business relations.” [9] Depending on 
interpretation, the e-ID may serve as a 
qualified form of necessary identification. 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1030/2002 (proposed act) 
proposal regarding a common format for 
residence permits for third-country national on 
the basis that it has proven technically 
impossible to incorporate biometrics onto a 
visa or residence permit in the form of a 
“sticker” 
Commission Decision 
2003/511/EC 
… on the publication of reference numbers of 
generally recognised standards for electronic 
signature products in accordance with 
Directive 1999/93/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council 
Directive 2004/18/EC …on the coordination of procedures for the 
award of public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts. 
Explicitly states that “one will need 
interoperability for advanced electronic 
signatures” [9] in order to develop the Internal 
Market. 
Table 23: Other relevant European legislation 
 
10.4 National Legislation 
Generally national legislation for implementing e-IDs is driven by two primary types 
of acts: (a) Identity Document Act and (b) Digital Signature Act. In addition, various 
other forms of legislation play a supporting role that help shape of the card is 
issued and deployed. Example: Data protection acts. 
 
Legislation Type Purpose / Function Examples 
e-Government Acts Provide a legal basis for 
the Identity Management 
Systems [29] 
 
e-Government Act March 
2004 (Austria) 
Identity Cards Act   Provision for national 
scheme of registration of 
individuals 
and for the issue of cards 
identify registered 
individuals 
UK Identity Cards Act 
(2006) [10] 
Identity Documents Law, 
(Estonia, January 1 2000) 
 
Digital Signatures Act Local legislation 
implementing European 
Directive on Electronic 
Signatures 
Digital Signature Act 
(Estonia, 2000) [70] 
Administrative Signature 
Order (Austria) 
Digital Signature Act 
(Malaysia, 1997) 
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Legislation Type Purpose / Function Examples 
Data Protection Act  Data Protection Act (UK, 
1998) 
Table 24: Legislation at National Level 
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11. CONCLUSION 
The original objectives of this study were to gain a better understanding of the 
implementation landscape of e-ID cards across Europe. In order to accomplish this, 
various national schemes were studied, as well as the underlying technologies and 
legislative drivers. Conducting these activities were the primary objectives of the 
report. For the most part, these objectives were accomplished. The outcome of this 
survey, however, was somewhat unexpected, as described below. 
 
First of all, while the focus of this paper was on e-ID Cards, during the course of 
the research, and while engaging in discussions with the e-ID card community, it 
become apparent that for many purposes a national e-ID was not important, but 
rather the e-ID in itself sufficed. The challenges faced in general with representing 
a (human) identity in electronic form, especially across different systems, is a far 
greater challenge than ensuring a citizen is represented uniquely. For this reason, 
considerable research today in the e-ID community is focussed on interoperability, 
sometimes from the perspective of federated identity management. In fact identity 
management systems, in general, are a “hot topic” within the e-ID domain. The 
review of identity management systems was not considered in scope for this 
project, but is certainly one area that could be researched further. 
 
Another key finding that was somewhat unexpected, was regarding the focus on a 
single identity card, just as with a single e-ID, is not the only way forward.  
Specifically, the Austrian implementation of e-ID illustrated that it is not necessary 
to rely on a single card – or for that matter electronic identity. In fact designing a 
system that is from the onset flexible has shown benefits regarding solving such 
“issues” as supporting interoperability.  
 
This brings up the topic of interoperability, as another key topic which took more 
importance than initially planned. Before starting the project, addressing this 
requirement was not defined (i.e. explicitly within the project objectives). It became 
apparent during the course of the research that this was a topic also meriting 
further study. In fact while working on this project, it was discovered that the topic 
of interoperability is a field of scientific research in itself, and it would be worth 
investigating further how lessons learned in the past and in other domains could be 
applied to e-ID card interoperability. At present, while there is discussion of e-ID 
card interoperability within the technical e-ID community, there are limited (Austria 
being the notable exception) illustrations of national e-ID card schemes addressing 
the issue of accepting foreign-issued e-ID cards. It seems like this is a short-
coming of the current designs, which tend to be only looking within existing national 
borders. A reason for this could be the fact that the design of e-ID cards is taking 
place at a national, rather than pan-European level.  
 
Another observation made during the course of this project is the focus on the e-ID 
card’s form factor. Today there is already a high usage of ISO compliant cards 
used for various aspects of identification (and authentication). Examples include 
existing national identity cards, banking payment cards, drivers’ licenses, health 
cards etc. While it may seem that an e-ID card’s form factor is not as critical as 
imagined to accomplish I-A-S functionality, the fact is that the use of mobile phone 
SIMs, USB dongles and in the future other form factors will be able to perform just 
as well the same functionality. Once again, Austria, despite their limitations (such 
as not using X.509v3 certificates as in other European schemes), have illustrated 
the constraint of reliance on a single card, let alone a single form factor. So far no 
other European e-ID card scheme seems to be following the path of the Austrians 
on this matter. 
 
Another observation while conducting research for this report were the numerous 
inhibitors associated with successful implementations (setting aside the fact that 
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the definition of a successful e-ID card implementation remains to be defined). 
While smartcards have been around for a long time, and are widely accepted in 
fairly closed user-group environments, their use (a) together with biometrics and (b) 
compliant for use to generate legally binding electronic signatures are still fairly 
new. [7]  This report also illustrated that in some cases, such as biometrics and the 
European Citizen Card (ECC) activities, standards are still being developed.  
 
What also was very interesting, and was well documented in the e-ID card 
literature, was is the lack of any strong central leadership for a pan-European e-ID 
card. Also, a “not invented here” mentality has meant that there has often been a 
drive towards home-grown solutions. Some countries, such as Austria and Estonia 
have gone out of their way to showcase their solution, with a desire to make them a 
de-facto standard. Their desire to promote their standard, however, is not backed 
by any form of legislative drivers at a pan-European level. Hence, it is unclear 
what, if any, e-ID card standard will emerge in the near future. 
 
Over and over again, reference was made in the e-ID card literature to the activities 
of ICAO. The activities of ICAO have lead, not only with regards to researching this 
report, but also by politicians, especially in the UK scheme, to interchange the 
ICAO guidelines or requirements for ePassports with requirements to be 
implemented in an e-ID card. ePassports and e-ID cards, while related at a certain 
level, should be treated as separate topics. Doing otherwise, has only caused 
unnecessary confusion, and may in the long run cause further poor design 
decisions to be made for e-ID card implementations.  
 
Another interesting finding that came from writing this report that was not expected, 
was the true lack of third-party (i.e. non-Government) applications looking to use 
national e-ID cards. Banks have already implemented their own e-Banking 
authentication schemes, and hence see little value-add from adopting a different 
technology. Outside Europe, Malaysia is a good example illustrating a close public-
private-partnership for e-ID card schemes. It seems however that in Europe the 
participation of private sector in defining e-ID card schemes is rather excluded. It 
merits possible further research in determining what secondary use of e-ID cards 
could be, and whether a tighter integration of third-party requirements could have a 
greater general acceptance of e-ID cards. 
 
Finally, returning to the importance of interoperability issues requiring further 
investigation. As the need grows of claiming social services across borders, the 
need to address interoperability issues becomes more critical. As was mentioned in 
the report, Poles working in the UK claiming retirement pensions after returning to 
Poland or British pensioners claiming social benefits from a retirement home in 
Bulgaria are just a few sample scenarios where e-Government applications need to 
be reviewed to ensure the requirements of e-Government applications are met in a 
Europe that is more and more operating without national borders. Purely for such 
scenarios where people are far away from their local public administrations, an 
interoperable e-ID card would be valuable to both citizens and governments alike. 
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